1 LLR 99
Source-verified historic case report · Volume I
The printed reporter identifies this case at 1 LLR 99. Source pages 99–106 (PDF pages 109–116). Term: [January Term , A. D. 1878.].
This transcription comes from the preserved PDF text layer. Its source caption and page boundaries were checked against the printed reporter, but the transcription has not been independently proofread against every scanned page. Refer to the scanned original for quotations.
99 JACKSON , BRIERLY and BRIGGS , Appellants , vs. JAMES MILTON HORACE , Appellee . [January Term , A. D. 1878.] Appeal from the Court of Quarter Sessions and Common Pleas , Grand Bassa County . Statute of Limitation -Agency . The plea of limitation is a question of law only, which must be decided by the court. Where a person or firm residing out of the country creates a local agent , who holds himself out as such to the defendant , the Statute of Limitation will begin to run simultaneously with said act , although the principal be absent from the country ; and upon an action brought , the defendant may plead the Statute of Limitation as a bar to the action, unless it can be shown that the agency had ceased or the agent had been absent from the country for a period long enough to take the cause out of the statute . This case is an action of debt brought before this court on an appeal from the Court of Quarter Sessions and Common Pleas , Grand Bassa County . The appel- lants ' cause of appeal is the refusal of the judge of said court to set aside the verdict of the jury , to whom had been submitted the questions raised by the defendants ' plea of limitation as a bar to the action , as said verdict was contrary to law, the evidence , and legal instructions of the court . In the examination of this , as in other cases , we must be guided by our statutes , which declare that "as a court of appeal we shall examine the matter in dispute upon the record only " ; and that "no judgment shall be reversed for any matter for which the attention of the court below shall not appear to have been called , either by some bill of exceptions or other part of the record ." Upon a thorough and careful review of the record , it is apparent that the judge regarded the plea of limitation as a mixed question of law and fact , which was an error , inasmuch as this court has decided on a previous occa- sion ( Cassell vs. Richardson ) that the " plea of limita- tion was a question purely of law" and "the trial of all 100 questions of mere law shall be by the court ." But as no exception was taken to the submission of the question to the jury , this court must consider that all objections thereto were waived by the litigants , as also to any other matter or question that might have arisen during the process of the trial to which exceptions were not taken , or called to the attention of the court below . We find that appellants ' counsel requested the judge to instruct the jury on the Act of Limitation , and that he did so by calling their attention to said act ; "that no part of the time either party was absent out of Liberia should be counted ; and they should decide whether J. L. Crusoe's acts made him agent in that single instance , or made him agent generally ." This is all with respect to the instructions , as to what they were , that can be found either upon the record or in the bill of exceptions , and from this it does not appear to this court wherein the jury went contrary to the instructions of the court , nor does it appear that any part of said instructions were excepted to as being illegal . According to the record , the evidence shows that Mr. L. Crusoe asked for and received amounts from Horace for Jackson , Brierly and Briggs in the year 1872 , and that he represented himself as having "full power and authority to demand payment ," but there is an absence of evidence to show that Mr. Crusoe was at any time thereafter out of the country , or for what period , or that his agencyship ceased before the appointment of H. J. Neyle by power of attorney dated October 4, 1873 . Were there any evidence to show that the agencyship of the one had ceased ere that of the other began , or that there had been an absence of either out of the country during his term of agency for a period long enough to take the cause out of the statute , there would be some reason for deciding that the verdict was contrary to evidence . Nor is the reference upon the record to an 101 arbitration sufficient for such a decision , as there is nothing definite stated with respect thereto , except that there was an arbitration appointed by the court . While from a moral standpoint it might be said that no man ought to make any plea that could prevent a fair investigation of any matter in which he might be interested , yet it is nevertheless the privilege of every one to avail himself of every advantage allowed by law, and this is a right of which the courts cannot deprive him. On the other hand , when the party fails to use the means placed at his disposal for his security , in the manner prescribed by law, it is not the office of the court , especially in the face of positive legislative enactments to the contrary , to make up said deficiency or neglect. Under all circumstances as presented by the record , this court must adjudge that the judgment of the court below is affirmed , appellants ruled to pay costs . FRANCES J. PAYNE and HESTER HUFF , Appel- lants, vs. THE REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA , Appellee . [January Term , A. D. 1878.] Appeal from the Court of Quarter Sessions and Common Pleas , Montserrado County . Infraction of the peace-Lewdness . The offence of lewdness is a misdemeanor punishable by indictment , and although falling under the head of infractions of the peace , the penalty attached by statute makes it cognizable before the Court of Quarter Sessions and Common Pleas upon indictment. This case is brought up on an appeal from the Court of Quarter Sessions and Common Pleas , Montserrado County . The defence of the appellee , the Republic of Liberia, was abandoned by the Attorney General in the words, "I decline to defend this case because that this charge of lewdness cannot now be sustained as an indict- able offense by the laws of the Republic of Liberia ." 102 Imperfect judgment having thereupon been asked for and granted, it remains for this court to give perfect judgment on the case . Before doing so , however , we regard it as necessary to give some expression on the issue raised , that lewdness cannot be sustained as an indictable offence . Our law places this offence with others under the general head of " infractions of the peace " ; but it also makes distinctions with regard to infractions , giving in one place justices of the peace jurisdiction over all "petty infractions of the peace where the fine is not more than ten dollars ," in another the Court of Common Pleas , in all infractions of the peace where the fine is more than twenty dollars . Having adopted the common law among others as a part of the laws of this Republic, with certain restric- tions, it becomes necessary , when our statutes are not clear enough, to have recourse thereto , and to apply the analogies thereof to the case . We find by the common law that lewdness was regarded as a misdemeanor , and as such was an indictable offence , and though our law has removed it to the head of "infractions of the peace ," yet these, too , are indictable . Bouvier defines a "breach of the peace " as a violation. of the public order , the offence of disturbing the public peace ; "an act of public indecorum is also a breach of the peace " ; and says , "The remedy for this offence is indict- ment." And we also find from other authorities that there are certain infractions or breaches of the peace which are indictable offences . Now while we would not infer that all of the offences classed under the head of "infractions of the peace" are indictable , yet since the statute itself does not state the punishment for each of them , it is left for the courts , by an application of the analogies of the common law to each case , to adjudge whether the common law penalties will reach such ; and the statute gives authority to decide 103 on the magnitude of the infraction when it gives the court jurisdiction in all cases where the fine is more than twenty dollars . While, therefore , it is the opinion of the court that lewdness as an infraction of the peace is an indictable offence, yet as the case has been abandoned by the appellee it only remains for the court to render perfect judgment . The judgment of the lower court is reversed , appellee ruled to pay costs . ROBERT R. JOHNSON , Appellant , vs. REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA, Appellee . [January Term , A. D. 1878. ] Appeal from the Court of Quarter Sessions and Common Pleas , Montserrado County . Damages . This is an action of damages brought up on appeal from the Court of Quarter Sessions and Common Pleas , Montserrado County . The case depends entirely on the construction of the word "otherwise" in the 3d section , page 147 , I. Lib . Stat ., of the act showing in what cases suits may be brought against the government. To us the obvious meaning of that section is that when- ever any person or persons shall receive any damage by the application of any part of his or their property by this Republic to its use , or by the application of this property otherwise , i . e., "in a different manner," "or in another way," than to its own use , so as to occasion any damage or loss , he or they shall on proof , etc. , receive such compensation as the jury shall under the circum- stances award . And the rights which it seems to be the spirit and intent of this law to guard are those guaran- teed by the Constitution , which provides that "private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation" ( Const . p . 233 , art. 1 , sec . 13 ) ; but being 104 an extension thereof , as it makes the government liable though the property is taken for use otherwise than public . The present case is not one of those authorized by law to be brought against the government . The court therefore adjudges that the judgment of the lower court is affirmed , and the appellant ruled to pay costs . ADMINISTRATORS OF THE ESTATE OF A. WASHINGTON, Appellants , vs. MARIA A. LLOYD , Appellee. [January Term , A. D. 1878. ] Appeal from the Court of Quarter Sessions and Common Pleas , Montserrado County . Ejectment . A person who has been absent from the country for more than seven years , of whom nothing has been heard, is presumed in law to be dead . Where in an estate of joint-tenancy one of the tenants has been absent from the country beyond a period of seven years and respecting whom nothing has been heard, the surviving tenant becomes the sole tenant by the doctrine of survivorship and may maintain an action in his sole right . At the January term of this court in the year A. D. 1875 , a mandate was directed by this court to the Court of Quarter Sessions , Montserrado County , ordering said Court of Quarter Sessions to try the said case over again ; because on the appeal from the said court it did not appear on the record in said case , on account of the mixture of questions of law and fact, for which party judgment ought to have been given . In obedience to the said mandate the said court below admitted the said case to its jurisdiction and submitted the same to a second trial by a jury empanelled for that purpose , upon which a verdict was returned for the appellee and judgment rendered thereon . An appeal , however , having been prayed for by the appellants , it was granted them , upon which this case is again before 105 this court. Therefore the court proceeds to notice the points in the bill of exceptions , to which its attention has been carefully given , and will dispose of them as they stand , in their order . The first point , then , to be considered and disposed of, is set forth thus : "The motion made by the defendants at the last September session of the court , to set aside the verdict and grant a new trial on the ground that said verdict is contrary to the law and the evidence of said case , Your Honor at this December session de- cided that said verdict is not contrary to the law and the evidence ; and therefore a new trial shall not be granted ." The evidence in the case marked "number one " is proof conclusive that the title to said property vests in the appellee, notwithstanding it shows that Meta Ann Lloyd was a joint tenant with the appellee ; because the fact having been fully established by the said evidence that all the right, title and interest whatever that the said John D. Johnson , Joseph H. Turpin and Charles B. Dunbar had to and in the said property hath been lawfully trans- ferred by them to the appellee and one Meta Ann Lloyd ; but the said Meta Ann Lloyd having been absent from this Republic beyond a period of seven years , she is presumed in law to be dead , and therefore Maria Ann Lloyd , being a joint tenant with the said Meta Ann Lloyd , takes the whole of the property by operation of law . Therefore this court says that the judge of the court below was right in deciding that the said verdict is not contrary to the law and the evidence , and therefore a new trial shall not be granted . The second point to which exception is taken is com- prehended in the following statement : "Because the court decided that the verdict of the jury rendered at the last term of the court is hereby ordered to be recorded , thereby giving Maria Ann Lloyd exclusive right to the property ; and the defendants are ruled to pay all costs." 106 The second point involves the same questions which have been disposed of under the first head of appellants ' bill of exceptions , therefore the court says the court below was right in ordering to be recorded the verdict of the jury. And here it ought to be remembered that fraud is not to be presumed as the object of the contract from the mere act of the husband's interposition in effecting the contract for the purchase of property for his wife , unless such contract was made in violation of some statutory regulation . Nor does it appear from evidence on record in this case that at the time of the purchase of said property Leo L. Lloyd was largely in debt ; because the purchase of said property was effected over three years before any suit was brought against him . But suppose he was in debt at the time, it was his duty to interpose and do whatever his wife desired , which was not in violation of law or tending to fraud ; for in the eye of the law the husband is the proper custodian of the wife's property , and as such the law requires him to join with her in all actions , of whatever kind they may be, to recover her rights or to redress any injury she may have sustained . In this action , however , the defendants , having failed to file their answer within the time prescribed by the statute , have waived their right to object to the non- joinder of the appellee's husband and her joint tenant, and were therefore compelled by the statute to rely upon the denial of the truth of the facts stated in the plain- tiff's complaint , and to rest on that defence only . Therefore the court, in confirmation of the judgment of the court below , adjudges that the appellee , Maria A. Lloyd , recover against the appellants , C. A. H. Washing- ton, administratrix , S. J. Cambell and R. H. Jackson , administrators of the estate of A. Washington , appel- lants , the land mentioned in the complaint of the appellee (plaintiff in the court below ) , and the sum of sixty dollars for her costs in this action .
Selected judicial document
Jackson et als. v. Horace
Supreme Court of Liberia