1 LLR 440
Source-verified historic case report · Volume I
The printed reporter identifies this case at 1 LLR 440. Source pages 440–462 (PDF pages 450–472). Term: [January Term , A. D. 1905. ].
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440 KRA , Plaintiff in Error, vs. REPUBLIC OF LI- BERIA , Defendant in Error. [January Term , A. D. 1905. ] Appeal from the Court of Quarter Sessions and Common Pleas, Montserrado County . Piracy . In Admiralty , it is proper for the trial court to order the issue of a monition , after a libel , charging a prisoner with a crime, has been filed and the case called for trial . Because depositions are unsealed is not sufficient ground to rule them out , where it does not appear that they have been tampered with . This case was heard in the admiralty jurisdiction of the Court of Quarter Sessions and Common Pleas of Montserrado County , at its May term , A. D. 1904. From the record it appears that a libel was filed against the libellee , now plaintiff in error , by the libellant , now defendant in error , in the December term of said court , A. D. 1903 , charging the said plaintiff in error with piratically taking from the person of one Capt . Mauser , master of the wrecked ship " Lulu Bohlen ," five hundred and sixty pounds sterling . The case was called up for hearing on the 14th day of April , when the counsel for the plaintiff in error moved that the case be dismissed because no monition had issued , nor had an order to issue same been made by the judge . The court below refused to dismiss the suit for the reasons alleged , and ordered the monition to be issued . The case was postponed until the May session . of the court , when a decree was made against the libellee , now plaintiff in error . To this decree , as well as to the several other rulings made in said case by the court below , the libellee , now plaintiff in error , excepted , and moved the case on a writ of error , before this tribunal of last resort , for rehearing . The first exception taken , as appears from the assign- ment of errors , is to the ruling of the court below upon 441 the motion to dismiss the suit and the subsequent order of the judge for the issuing of the monition . This court would remark , that in admiralty the court of original jurisdiction may exercise greater powers than what are generally allowed by the arbitrary and tech- nical rules of the common law. This rule was exhaust- ively considered by this court in the case , Republic of Liberia against W. C. Dennis , determined in 1898. In that case the identical point presented for our considera- tion in the first assignment , was submitted , and this court handed down the following rule , quoted from Benedict's Admiralty , as its opinion on this point : " In admiralty practice the law allows a greater scope of privilege to parties than in common law practice . In admiralty the court is bound to determine the case submitted to its cognizance , upon equitable principles and according to the rules of natural justice . The grand object of doing justice between the parties is superior to technical rules ; and where the strictest prac- tice of the English common law , or the civil law , would turn a party out of court , or defer , or prevent justice , by considering an arbitrary rule of proceedings as para- mount to all other considerations , the American admi- ralty finds in the educated reason and cultivated dis- cretion of the court the means of defeating chicanery , rectifying mistakes , supplying defects , and of recon- structing his case , as far as necessary , without the loss of such progress as he may have already made . In admiralty interests of great moment are involved to the nation , whether in respect to its own citizens or to aliens . It upholds the nation's majesty and credit . Largely it affects its revenue , which is its life - blood , and that which enables it to exist and to maintain its independence , and to develop its growth and afford to it the means of sup- port and protection to its citizens ; therefore the law will not allow justice to be defeated for the want of techni- calities or mere form , or slight , non - essential omissions ." 442 Here in the case under consideration the ship of a friendly state, with whom we hold treaties of friendship and of commerce , had stranded at a remote point on our coast and the master had been piratically robbed of a large sum of money. The felon was discovered and taken into custody and the machinery of the court put in motion to punish the offence . A libel charging the prisoner with the crime was properly filed and the case called up for trial . But at this stage of the proceedings it was discovered that no process had been issued , nor had the judge below made the necessary order in the premises . According to the strict rules of the common law, such an irregularity could not be cured in the same. suit and the motion to dismiss would have been well- founded . But , as we have already observed , the rule is otherwise in admiralty proceedings , where "the grand object of doing justice between the parties is superior to technicalities in form , or other slight omissions." Supposing the judge below had adhered to the conten- tions of the learned counsel for the libellee , now plaintiff in error , and dismissed the suit, and supposing before process could be issued the accused should have absconded and his discovery became impossible , is it difficult to imagine the ill - effect such a result would have produced upon the minds of the tribes scattered along our coast , where the wrecks of foreign merchantmen are frequently occurring , and whose piratical acts and mal- treatment to the passengers and crew of these wrecks have more than once been made the subject of inter- national inquiry . Would it be illogical to presume that the non - punish- ment of the accused after guilt had been confessed and become generally known along the Kroo coast , would have encouraged the practice of piracy upon wrecks at remote points along our coast , by confirming the impres- sion already held by the natives that wrecks and wreck- age are bona fide the property of the tribes near whose 443 town they happen to occur , and that the law of civilized states will not punish one who converts private property to his personal use under such circumstances ? It would seem in this particular case , that even if there had not existed that rule of law in admiralty prac- tice , upon which the learned judge acted in refusing to dismiss the suit , he would have been justified in the course he adopted by the stern reasons of public policy and transparent justice . We proceed next to consider the second assignment , which is taken to the court's admitting as evidence depositions taken by a justice of the peace , in a case of larceny , against the plaintiff in error , for the same act which constitutes the subject of this suit. The grounds laid are : ( 1 ) "That the said depositions were not taken by the deponent nor the Justice of the Peace , but by his clerk " ; and ( 2 ) "that they were presented unsealed ." As to the first ground , we fail to see the reason of it. It appears from the second , that the depositions were properly taken before a Justice of the Peace and that they were signed in the legal form by the deponent . The mere fact that they were recorded by the magis- trate's clerk and not by the magistrate himself , cannot impeach their genuineness and validity ; especially so when, as we have said , they were signed by the witnesses who made the statements , and a jurat in legal form signed by the Justice of the Peace before whom they were taken , which is prima facie evidence of their validity. As to the second ground , this court is of opinion that the simple fact that the depositions were presented at the trial unsealed , but which fact is unconnected with any circumstance tending to show that they had been tampered with , or that they had in any respect been altered , was not , in the opinion of this court , sufficient ground for the court below to have ruled them out. It should be strictly observed , however , that the exception 444 on this point as laid in the assignment of error, is to the taking and non -sealing of the depositions and not as to the legal right to use in evidence ex parte depositions in a case of this nature . This not having been raised in the pleadings and assignments , the court does not feel itself bound to pass upon it and therefore reserves opinion thereon . The third assignment is taken to the decree of the court below , delivered in the premises on the 25th day of May , 1904 , in which the libellee , now plaintiff in error, was adjudged guilty of piracy , and the following punish- ment inflicted ; namely , "That the libellee , now plaintiff in error , will make restitution of the stolen money £ 560, less the amount recovered by the government, and forfeit and pay to the government two hundred dollars ; and failing to pay said amount , he shall be imprisoned in the com- mon jail, with hard labor in chains, sufficiently long to pay said amount at the rate of six dollars per month ." Summing up the evidence produced at the trial , this court finds that the conclusions of the judge below upon the facts submitted are well and substantially founded . Independently of the depositions, whose admission as evidence was contested by the learned counsel for the libellee , now plaintiff in error , a strong and cogent case was made out by the prosecution , from the oral testi- mony put in evidence . But this court is obliged to announce that after a careful study of the statutes con- trolling this case it has failed to discover the law upon which the court below predicated that part of its decree relative to the punishment inflicted . Beyond a contro- versy the learned judge below mistook the law on this point . In an act defining piracy , found on the 145th page of the Compiled Statutes of Liberia , in Sec . 11 it is stated that "In all cases of conviction in any of the courts in this Republic of any of those crimes denominated by the law as piracy , to which no specific penalty has been 445 assigned , and in which murder has not been committed , the penalty shall be a fine of not less than five hundred dollars , and in default of payment , imprisonment for a term of five years , but in cases in which murder has been committed the penalty shall be imprisonment for life ." This we understand to be the law controlling the judg- ment in this case . This court therefore , under the authority of the statute above cited, reverses the decree of the court below , so far as it relates to the punishment , and will now proceed to make the decree the court below ought to have made . This court decrees that Kra, the plaintiff in error , is guilty of piracy and that he is sentenced to pay a fine of three thousand dollars . Failing to pay said fine , he shall be imprisoned in the common jail for a term of five years . The clerk of this court is hereby authorized to issue a mandate to the judge below , informing him of this decree . AMSTEAD WOOD , Appellant , vs. REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA, Appellee . [January Term , A. D. 1905. ] Appeal from the Court of Quarter Sessions and Common Pleas , Montserrado County . Murder . Constitutional law-Twice in jeopardy . Where after a jury has been empanelled to try a prisoner charged with murder , one of the jurors separates from the panel and goes beyond the precincts of the court, and the trial judge thereupon disbands such jury and empanels a new jury and proceeds to try the cause , such action is not in violation of the section of the constitution providing that "no person shall for the same offence be twice put in jeopardy of life and limb ." This case is before this court upon an appeal from the Court of Quarter Sessions and Common Pleas for the County of Montserrado . From the record it appears that the accused was indicted and tried at the December 446 term of said court in the year A. D. 1903 , for the atro- cious crime of murder . Upon arraignment the prisoner plead " not guilty" to the charge, whereupon a jury was empanelled to try the issue raised by said plea . It further appears from the record , that during the progress of the trial , that is to say , on the second day thereof , it was brought to the knowlege of the judge presiding over said trial , that on the first day's hearing of said case , and after a part of the evidence on the part of the prosecution had been heard and submitted , and the jury duly charged with the acquittal or conviction of the prisoner , one of the jurors absented himself from the panel and went a considerable distance beyond the pre- cincts of the court and out of the sight and hearing of his fellows . It further appears that upon these facts being brought to the knowledge of the court , his honor , considering the influence which may have been brought to bear upon said juror while separated from his fellows , either for or against the prisoner , and in order that the stream of justice might not be polluted by the possible misconduct of a juryman , in the exercise of sound dis- cretion , well supported , as we think , by the principles of law, disbanded the jury to whom the case had been submitted and empanelled a new jury to try the cause. At this stage of the proceedings the counsel for the accused presented a motion demanding the discharge of the prisoner upon the ground that the empanelling of a second jury to try the same cause operated as a second jeopardy to prisoner . The court below overruled the motion and proceeded with the trial . After hearing the evidence for and against the accused and the arguments presented by the learned counsel for the prosecution and defence , the jury , after due deliberation , on the 24th day of December returned a verdict of guilty . The counsel for the prisoner at this stage moved for a new trial , which motion was overruled , and the court below , on the 30th day of said month, pronounced sentence of death upon the prisoner . 447 To this sentence , as well as to the other rulings of the court below in the premises , the counsel for the defence excepted and has brought the case before this tribunal upon a bill of exceptions for review . This court will now proceed to consider separately the several points laid in the bill of exceptions . So important does this court regard the principles of law involved in the first exception , that it deems it proper to set forth this excep- tion in full . It is taken as follows : "Because when , on the 18th day of December , A. D. 1903 , a jury having been empanelled to try the above entitled cause , your honor , on the 19th day of December , A. D. 1903 , after the evidence had been gone into and not concluded , informed the counsel for the state and the counsel for the defence that one of the jurors had been seen away from the rest of the jury with one of the bailiffs of the court , and asked that the place of that juror be sup- plied and he be dismissed from said jury , or that the said jury be dismissed ; to which the state's attorney assented and to which the counsel for the defence dissented , and your honor then disbanded said jury and ordered said case to be taken up de novo , to which prisoner excepted ." The law involved in this exception relates to a con- stitutional provision , and is one which the Supreme Court of the Republic of Liberia has never passed upon and thereby settled . The provision is borrowed from the American Constitution , after which our Constitu- tion is framed , and appears to have been introduced into the organic law of this Republic as a safeguard against the abuse of public justice and an equitable protection to life and liberty . The last clause of the 7th section of the Liberian Constitution declares that "no person shall for the same offence be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb " ; that is to say, no person shall for the commission of the same crime be twice tried . The question as to what is jeopardy and at what stage of a legal proceeding it may be technically said 448 to begin , is one which has afforded a wide field for legal discussion and research . In the American courts the express enactments of the several states have declared what shall and what shall not be regarded as jeopardy in criminal prosecutions before the courts of the respec- tive states . And so divergent and technical are the shades of opinions expressed in these states upon this great subject, that a comparative study of them is ren- dered in a large degree perplexing , though exceedingly interesting and instructive . But it is the common law definition of the term jeopardy which interests us in the consideration of the case under review , and not the lex scripta of the Ameri- can states , and we shall therefore proceed to discuss the principles laid down on the point by some of the ablest and most profound common writers , whose works have been admitted as text -books in the courts of the Republic . And firstly , Mr. Bouvier defines jeopardy to be "The situation of a prisoner when a trial jury is sworn and empanelled to try his case upon a valid indict- ment , and such jury has been charged with his deliver- ance ." ( 1 Bouv . Law Dict . p . 751. ) Mr. Bishop in his treatise on criminal law confirms this view and enters into an exhaustive and minute treatment of the subject . We shall only quote here that part of his observations on jeopardy which applies to the case in point . "It appears ," he says , "a point not very clear on the authorities , that the keeping of the prisoner's legal rights is not at all with the jury, but only with the judge ; and that therefore if a juror of his own motive escapes so that no verdict can be rendered , such escape shows the prisoner never to have been in jeopardy . The same result would perhaps follow if the jury separated with the consent of the officer in attendance who had no right to give any consent ." "So it plainly must be," he continues , "if it should be found that a juror was legally incompetent to sit , or not sufficiently sworn , or 449 if the cause should appear to have been tried by a less number of jurors than the law requires." ( 1 Bisp . Crim . Law , sec. 670. ) Besides these exceptions to the general rule mentioned here by Mr. Bishop , others laid down in the text books as legal necessities may be mentioned , and which have been uniformly upheld by the decisions of the English and American courts at law . As for example, where during the trial the judge takes sick and the trial cannot proceed , the jury, although sworn and empanelled , and the evidence perhaps gone into , may be disbanded and the trial postponed , and the prisoner is not entitled to a discharge on that account . So also the sickness or incapacity of a juror , sickness of the prisoner , expira- tion of the term , inability of a jury to agree , separation of the jury before their verdict has been made up . When- ever any of these cases arises during the course of a trial , the judge may , with or without the consent of the prisoner , disband the jury and if necessary postpone the trial , and the prisoner will not be entitled to a dis- charge nor can he legally raise the plea of jeopardy when a new jury has been empanelled to try his cause . Let us for a moment enquire into the reasons of the law for so holding . And for this purpose we shall reason upon the facts presented in this case and which are pertinent to the foregoing observations . Here, in the case before us , after the jury had been sworn and empanelled to try the issue raised by the plea of the prisoner , a juror separated from the panel and went beyond the precincts of the court . The possi- bilities were that he may, during said separation, have come in contact with some influence which may have swayed his mind and his vote in favor of or against the prisoner . He may have been approached by the hired agents or friends of the accused and bribed to give his vote in prisoner's behalf , no matter how conclusively the state may have proved his guilt . Or , on the other 450 hand, what may be regarded as still more wicked and reprehensible , his vote and influence might have been secured by the haters of the prisoner , to bring down a verdict against him, however doubtful and insufficient the evidence against him may have been . Under such circumstances , the judge , who , as we have seen, is charged with the keeping of the prisoner's rights , could not have an abiding conviction that the ends of public justice would not be defeated , if that juror were permitted to pass upon the prisoner's guilt . He could not feel a moral certainty that the verdict to be delivered under such circumstances would be guided by the preponderance of the evidence submitted , and that it would be free from the taint of corruption and perversity . What , then, let us inquire , would be his reasonable duty under such circumstances ? Obviously , as a dispenser of transparent justice, his duty would be to disband the jury whose legal disinterestedness in the cause could no longer be relied upon , and to empanel a new jury. In summing up the law bearing on the point raised in the first exception in the bill, this court will remark that in its opinion the court below did not err in over- ruling the motion to discharge the prisoner upon the ground that the former jury had been disbanded . Under the circumstances surrounding the case , the judge was in the exercise of sound discretion ; the necessity arising justified this course . To hold that the disbanding of a jury under such circumstances is illegal and should operate as a discharge of the prisoner , would be setting aside plain principles of the statute and common law, and producing loop -holes for the escape of the guilty . But the case would have been far otherwise had the court at this stage of the proceedings disbanded the jury for any cause not recognized by the law as a reasonable. necessity for so doing . In handing down its decision on this much -disputed provision of the Constitution , the court desires to have 451 its premises , which it thinks are well upheld by law and reason , distinctly and clearly understood . Jeopardy , as this court understands the law, attaches when , upon a valid indictment , the prisoner is arraigned and pleads , and the jury empanelled and sworn to try the issue raised by the plea . If at this stage of the proceedings the jury is disbanded and trial postponed , except for the plain causes of necessity mentioned in the common law and referred to above , the prisoner , under the great provision of the Constitution , may demand his dis- charge . But if, on the other hand , the postponement arises from palpable necessity , over which the court had no control , the prisoner may be tried and convicted by a second jury , upon the same indictment , which pro- ceeding is only a continuance of the former proceedings . The supreme object of the Constitution , it appears to us, is to protect the prisoner against the inconveniences of repeated prosecutions for the same crime , which would tend to cripple his liberty and freedom . The chief guarantee of the Liberian Constitution is the protection of the liberties and freedom of the commonwealth . The idea may have derived its origin from the study of the Roman and English law in its early stages , when the freedom of men was sometimes greatly crippled and hampered by repeated prosecutions for the same offence . But we fail to recognize in said provision of our Con- stitution any design to baffle justice and to screen crime . To admit this would be to impugn the righteous motives of the sainted framers of the organic law. This court refuses to entertain an opinion on this provision of the Constitution , which is in conflict with other portions of the solemn compact, in conflict with the interpreta- tions of the American courts upon a similar provision in the American Constitution , and in conflict with natural law and the rules and principles of written law . We proceed next to consider the 5th and 6th excep- tions in the bill . The 5th exception is taken to the 452 court's ruling on the motion presented by the learned counsel for prisoner , praying a new trial upon the ground that the verdict of the jury presented in said case "is manifestly against the law and evidence " ; which motion the court overruled . The 6th exception is taken to the sentence pronounced upon said verdict . The 5th exception brings us to the consideration of the evidence produced at the trial , upon which the guilt of the prisoner is claimed to have been established . Following the generally accepted principle of law that "every man is presumed to be innocent until the con- trary is proven ," and that "the burden of proof rests upon the party maintaining the affirmative ," it follows that when a prisoner is charged with the commission of a crime the facts necessary to establish his guilt must be proven by the State . And so careful is the law in guarding the interest of the prisoner that the State , to convict , must not only make out an apparent case , but it must prove the guilt of the accused beyond a rational doubt . The proof must be so conclusive as to exclude every hypothesis of the prisoner's innocence . Evidence is ranged by law writers into three general groups , namely , positive or direct evidence , presumptive evidence , and circumstantial evidence . Positive or direct evidence is that means of proof which tends to show the existence of a fact in question from a knowl- edge of such fact derived from one's own senses . Pre- sumptive evidence is that which shows the existence of one fact by proof of the existence of another , from which the first may be inferred . Circumstantial evidence tends to prove a disputed fact by proof of the other facts , which have a legitimate tendency , from the laws of nature , or the usual connection of things , to lead the mind to conclude that the fact exists which is sought to be established . From an inspection of the record we find that the evidence in this case chiefly falls under the last two 453 heads , namely, presumptive and circumstantial . And the court would here remark that the greater number of crimes found upon the records of criminal courts are established by this species of proof . It is not frequent, speaking comparatively , that misdemeanors and crimes are committed before the public gaze . The natural tendency is to seek secrecy and concealment . So that if the law only recognized , as sufficient to convict , that quality of evidence we call positive , the safety of society would be greatly jeopardized by miscreants who would perpetrate their diabolical deeds either under cover of night , or under some other cover which the eye of jus- tice could not penetrate . In this case the prisoner is charged with the wilful and malicious killing of a human being , under circumstances greatly aggravated . Summing up the evidence , we find that some time before the commission of the crime with which the accused is charged , deceased and prisoner had a quarrel about some ducks , which deceased accused prisoner with stealing ; that shortly after this affair , deceased's house was fired into and prisoner was arrested upon suspicion , but was discharged for want of proof ; that later , de- ceased's house was burned , but the felon was not dis- covered ; that after the shooting into the house , prisoner went to wife of deceased , and , referring to the incident , warned her that a greater calamity would befall her . He mentioned a conspiracy which had been formed , as prisoner said, against her, and asked for money , in con- sideration of which he promised to stop the plot , alleg- ing that he had the power to do so . It was given in evidence by witness John Hagan , that prisoner subse- quently confessed that it was he who fired into deceased's house , and that his intention at the time was to kill deceased . It was also stated in evidence that on the day deceased was killed , a warrant was issued against prisoner and as the prisoner saw the officer approach the house of Garnet , where he was , he fled . Another 454 witness states that in the afternoon of the same day the crime was committed , he saw prisoner on the road to Careysburg , under circumstances which appear to the court very suspicious . He further states that prisoner had with him a gun . Witness Mulbar's testimony , when taken together with the other witnesses ' , removes much of the doubt which otherwise would have surrounded the case. It is the last link of a long chain of evidence , which enabled the law to finally trace the crime to prisoner . Without Mulbar's testimony it would have been difficult to connect the former acts and admissions of prisoner , which laid the foundation for strong pre- sumption , and his flight from the officer and other sus- picious conduct , with the actual commission of the crime charged. The voluntary confession of the prisoner to witness Mulbar , under circumstances which excluded the idea of its having been made under duress , or threat , or fear , or inducement , established a strong case for the prose- cution , the corpus delicti having been proven by inde- pendent testimony . Taking witness Mulbar's statement , which proves the confession of prisoner to the alleged crime , together with the presumptive and circumstantial proof submitted , we feel no hesitancy in asserting that the guilt of the accused has been made out with legal certainty . It was the privilege of the prisoner to have rebutted this evidence and thereby raise a rational doubt as to his guilt , which doubt , if well founded , would have operated in his favor . But we find that this was not even attempted . Traversing the whole evidence with a determination to discover whatever could be discovered therein , in prisoner's favor , we have found not the slightest foundation upon which to predicate his inno- cence . It was insisted upon by the learned counsel for the accused , in his arguments , that prisoner was not in the settlement of Bensonville at the time of the commission 455 of the crime ; but this fact , if it really existed , and if the defence intended to utilize it in its defence , should have been pleaded under the plea of alibi, and proven . This the prisoner failed to do . Having most carefully and deliberately examined the whole evidence in this case and the law bearing upon the questions of law raised , we are forced to conclude , upon the authority of the evidence , that the prisoner Armstead Woods did wilfully and of his malice afore- thought kill and murder Samuel Coker . This court is consequently under the painful necessity , in the discharge of its solemn responsibilities as the highest dispenser of public justice in this country , to affirm the death sentence pronounced against prisoner in the court below . The judgment of the court below is therefore affirmed and the clerk of this court is hereby authorized to issue from his office a mandate to the judge of the court below , informing him of this decision . GUST LACKMAN , Appellant , vs. J. J. W. JOHNS , Appellee . [January Term , A. D. 1905. ] Appeal from the Court of Quarter Sessions and Common Pleas , Sinoe County . Damages. In an action of damages for the unlawful killing of a hog, the allega- tion of a sum as special damages must be proven by unimpeached evidence , otherwise only the assessed valuation can be recovered . This case was tried in the Court of Quarter Sessions and Common Pleas for Sinoe County and judgment given against defendant, now appellant . From inspection of the record we find that the cause of action grew out of an injury alleged to have been done to the plaintiff, now appellee , by the unlawful killing of a hog by the defendant, now appellant . The action was brought to 456 redress said wrong and the plaintiff, now appellee, in his declaration plead special damages in the sum of $ 150.00 for the injury complained of. The jury to whom was entrusted the duty to ascertain the damages , if any , the plaintiff, now appellee , had sustained , awarded the sum of $ 81.00 as damages , and upon this verdict the court gave judgment accordingly . From this judgment , as well as from other rulings of the court below , the defendant, now appellant , excepted and appealed to this judicature for a rehearing of the case . There are three distinct exceptions set forth in the bill of exceptions , but this court finds it unnecessary to consider them distinctly , since they virtually raise one and the same point , and therefore we propose to con- sider them collectively . The main exception is to the amount awarded by the jury and confirmed by the judgment of the court . Before proceeding to traverse the evidence upon which the verdict purports to be founded , we would observe that actions of damages are legally brought to redress injuries which the law has not provided some other remedy for . The object of such actions , speaking in a general sense , is to compel the wrongdoer to make satisfaction for wrongs he has committed upon the person , property or relation of the party entitled to bring the action . Generally speaking , it does not partake of the nature of a criminal prosecu- tion , whose object is to inflict punishment . But there are exceptions to the general rule , as will be found laid down in the statutes of Liberia ; as, for example, in an action of damages for the seduction of a wife or daughter ; the illegal taking away or harboring a wife , child or apprentice under twenty-one years of age ; or enticing an idiot or insane person from his or her legally appointed guardian or trustee ; the breach of contract of promise or engagement to marry , etc. Actions of this kind, though sounding in damages , partake of the nature of criminal prosecutions , and a 457 jury in assessing damages in suits founded upon the foregoing causes , will not only take into consideration the actual loss or inconvenience of the plaintiff and award such sum as would adequately satisfy such loss or inconvenience , but may exceed this bound and award a greater sum , as, what is called in law, exemplary damages . But the case under review does not fall within this category ; that is, it does not belong to that class of injuries for the redress of which the jury is not only to consider the actual loss or inconvenience sustained by the plaintiff and award accordingly , but may give exem- plary damages . It is true in this case that the plaintiff, now appellee , plead special damages ; this , however , he was bound to prove substantially or the jury would not be justified in relying upon his claim as a just and equitable satisfaction for the injury complained of . It is a settled principle of law that special damages when relied upon must be specially pleaded and proven . The mere fact of alleging a sum in the complaint as requisite to satisfy the injury complained of , will not warrant a jury to take cognizance thereof unless it is proven by unimpeached testimony at the trial . In the case under review there was no evidence sub- mitted to show that plaintiff, now appellee , had been damaged to the amount pleaded in the complaint . This , as we have said , was necessary in a case where special damages is relied upon . The jury was then bound to award such damages as was shown by the evidence that the plaintiff , now appellee, had actually sustained . According to the evidence the value of the hog killed was assessed by appraisers to be $ 8.00 . This court cannot see upon what evidence the verdict of the jury was predicated , and regards the damages awarded as excessive . The verdict being illegal , it follows that the judgment , which is predicated upon said verdict , must necessarily be illegal also , and this court adjudges that said verdict and judgment are illegal . 458 The judgment of the court below is hereby reversed . This court further adjudges that the plaintiff, now appellee, shall recover from the defendant , now appel- lant , the sum of eight dollars for his damages , and all legal costs in the action . The clerk of this court is hereby authorized to issue a mandate , under his hand and the seal of his office , to the judge of the court below , informing him of this decision . MANNY GOFAH and YANTEE M'LANH , Appel- lants , vs. PETER , alias DEBBOOH WREH , Appellee . [January Term , A. D. 1905. ] Appeal from the Court of Quarter Sessions and Common Pleas , Montserrado County . Native Custom . Damages . This case was entered in the Monthly and Probate Court of Montserrado County , at its August term , A. D. 1904 , before His Honor Judge R. J. Clark . After hear- ing the petition and evidence in the case , his honor the judge was pleased to give a judgment in favor of Peter , alias Debbooh Wreh , defendant , now appellee , to the effect that Manny Gofah and Yantee M'lanh shall pro- duce the body of Tetee in one month from date ( 24th day of August , 1904 ), and that they each give a bond of one hundred dollars for the safe production of the said Tetee ; in failure thereof , they to pay to petitioner his dowry money of £ 28 ; and the costs to be paid by defendant . Whereupon , the defendants , now appellants , Manny Gofah and Yantee M'lanh , excepted to the judg- ment of the judge , and prayed for an appeal to this the Supreme Court , seeking substantial justice . The case , therefore , comes up to this court on a bill of exceptions . From a review of the record in the case the court has been informed of its history , as follows : Peter , alias Debbooh Wreh , plaintiff , now appellee , " pryed ," that is , 459 abducted (the word is Kroo ) one Tetee , the wife of Blackwill Sherman's son , which occasioned much dis- satisfaction and trouble , to the extent that the town's people were two days deciding the matter , which they finally succeeded in doing by the plaintiff, now appellee , agreeing to pay the dowry money to Blackwill Sher- man's son, according to the native or Kroo custom when a man " pries" another man's wife , which according to evidence he did . The woman Tetee then became the wife of appellee . A short time subsequently , Yantee M'lanh desired to go to the coast to see her mother , who was reported to be very sick ; but appellee would not allow her to go at that time , so the question rested . A short time after, his wife Tetee left him and went to Manny Gofah . Appellee then agreed that his wife go to the coast to see her mother if Manny Gofah and Debbey would become security for her return to him in one month and fifteen days ' time . They, Manny Gofah and Debbey , bound themselves by a written instrument to appellee for the safe return of Tetee within the stipulated time . Being thus secured , appellee allowed his wife Tetee to go . But it appears that Tetee did not return at the stipulated time , but was away for six months . Before she returned , however , appellee himself went to the coast , and after his return home the bondsmen pro- duced and delivered his wife Tetee to him and he received her ; but in a day or two his wife told him that she was not his wife , and she did not wish to stay with him, for she had another husband . The bond and security given for her return from the coast in one month and fifteen days was kept by appel- lee for the reason , as we gather from the evidence , that he feared she would abscond , as it was reported that her family would send her away. She subsequently did. abscond , left her husband , and went away on a steamer . The appellee then held Manny Gofah and Yantee M❜lanh , aunt and sister of Tetee , for the delivery of his said wife 460 Tetee, he still holding the bond given by Manny Gofah and Debbey . He held Yantee M'lanh because she was the sister of Tetee his wife , and because Tetee would often stay with her sister and kept her clothes at her house . This is a short but true history of the case . Now this court will review the evidence in the case and see how far the appellants are responsible for the detention and non -delivery of Tetee , and whether the judgment of the court is in keeping with the evidence . Peter , alias Debbooh , petitioner and now appellee , states that Tetee is his wife ; that he "pryed" her from her former husband and paid the dowry money, accord- ing to the custom of his tribe ; that he consented to her going to the coast to see her mother , under bond and security given by Debbey and Manny Gofah , for her return at the time set ; but after the expiration of six months she returned to him and that he received her , retaining the bond of Debbey and Manny Gofah ; that subsequently his wife refused to take him as her hus- band, and said she had another husband , and finally absconded from him . Manny Gofah states , in answer to the question of Attorney C. B. Dunbar , that she did not have appellee's wife . In answer to the questions by the court , she states that she does not know where Tetee is ; that she hears that she ran away on Sunday ; that Tetee did not tell her that she was going away ; that Tetee did not stop in her house when she returned from the coast , but that she stopped with Debbey , who brought her home ; that she does not know how many days Tetee stopped with her husband . Yantee M'lanh stated , in answer to the questions of Attorney Dunbar , that last week Sunday Peter ( appellee ) came to her and asked her for Tetee , his wife , and says that she told him that she did not have her and that she did not know where she was at ; that she saw her last week Sunday ; that she went to her place and had a bath early in the morning ; that her box was not at her place because 461 they were relatives , and that they kept their clothes together because they were sisters . Much of the evi- dence is the repetition of the same given by other wit- nesses , hence we will quote only such evidence as may or may not have a tendency to support the judgment of the judge below . Mr. Anderson , Governor of Kroo Town , states that Tetee was with her husband in his house , and that she ran away from her husband's house ; that she said that she did not want Peter , appellee , as her husband ; that their custom respecting a man "prying " another man's wife or a woman leaving her husband is that the man to whom the woman goes , or who "prys" her , pays the dowry money , and if she run away and go to her family, her family is responsible , and they must return the money ; but if she run away of her own accord , no one is responsible ; that the woman Tetee ran off from Peter her husband on Sunday morning ; that he , Peter , lives next door to him , witness ; that she went off before day ; that Peter came and made complaint to him , saying that his wife Tetee had run off from him ; that he heard her people were going to make her run ; that he did not know if Manny Gofah sent Tetee away. Now, then , after a careful review of the case and the evidence adduced , this court is of opinion , based on the law and the custom of the natives (meaning aborigines ) , that Peter , alias Debbooh Wreh , appellee , is estopped from holding security against Manny Gofah and Debbey , for the ostensible reason that notwithstanding the said Manny Gofah and Debbey gave him, the said appellee , security for the return of his wife Tetee in one month and fifteen days from the time she left home to go to the coast , and notwithstanding the time stipulated in the bond was not observed , he , the appellee , according to evidence , received her on her return , she being deliv- ered to him by Debbey , one of the bondsmen . Appellee should have refused reception of his wife Tetee , since 462 the sureties did not keep the stipulation , and should have held them responsible , and have the bond can- celled by law, even if he was disposed to take his wife afterwards ; for he could have legally taken her accord- ing to native custom . Since the bond had nothing to do with the dowry money unless the sureties paid to him the dowry money , and again , since Tetee , appellee's wife , said she would not stay with him again as his wife , because another man had "pryed" her, he , the appellee , should have compelled this new "pryer" to return to him his dowry money. And the court is further of the opinion that no evidence has been adduced in the case to prove that Manny Gofah and Yantee M'lanh were parties to the absconding of Tetee, the appellee's wife . Tetee keeping her clothes and bathing at Yantee's house , which evidence in the case shows is the custom of the Kroos , is no proof that Yantee M'lanh was a party to Tetee's absconding . This court fails to see the congruity of the judgment of the judge below , if the evidence in the case , both as to facts and Kroo customs respecting marriage , is to be considered . The judgment of the judge appears to be based on his personal knowledge of the Kroo customs , while the evidence in the case shows the contrary . This court , therefore , is compelled to reverse the judgment of the judge below , and rule appellee to pay costs . The clerk of the Supreme Court is hereby ordered to issue a mandate to His Honor Judge R. J. Clark of the Monthly and Probate Court , Montserrado County , to the effect of this judgment .
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