1 LLR 417
Source-verified historic case report · Volume I
The printed reporter identifies this case at 1 LLR 417. Source pages 417–429 (PDF pages 427–439). Term: [January Term , A. D. 1904.].
This transcription comes from the preserved PDF text layer. Its source caption and page boundaries were checked against the printed reporter, but the transcription has not been independently proofread against every scanned page. Refer to the scanned original for quotations.
417 J. NATHANIEL SKIPPER , Plaintiff in Error , vs. REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA , Defendant in Error . [January Term , A. D. 1904.] Appeal from the Court of Quarter Sessions and Common Pleas , Grand Bassa County . Murder-Principal in the second degree-Punishment . The statutes and the common law adopted by the Republic rec- ognize no difference with respect to the punishment to be inflicted upon principals found guilty of murder in the first and second degrees . This case is before this court upon a writ of error , taken upon a judgment rendered by the Court of Quarter Sessions and Common Pleas , for the County of Grand Bassa . We find from examination of the record in the case , that the accused , J. Nathaniel Skipper , the plain- tiff in error , was indicted at the June term and tried at the September term , 1902 , of the Court of Quarter Ses- sions and Common Pleas , for the County aforesaid , for the atrocious crime of murder ; that on being arraigned the prisoner plead "not guilty" to the charge ; that a jury having been empanelled to try the issue raised by said plea , after hearing the evidence and arguments for and against the accused , it returned a verdict in which the said J. Nathaniel Skipper , plaintiff in error , was found "guilty of murder as principal in the second degree ." Upon this verdict the court below , on the 7th day of October , 1902 , pronounced sentence , whereby the said prisoner was sentenced to the punishment of death . To this judgment the prisoner excepted and has brought the case before this court , upon a writ of error , for review . Upon the case being called for hearing at the bar of this court , the counsellors for the plaintiff and the defendant in error , waived arguments and jointly sub- mitted for the consideration and determination of this tribunal one point only , namely, " Did or did not the court below err in pronouncing the sentence of death 418 upon a verdict of murder as principal in the second degree ?" We would remark before proceeding further, that this is a case involving the life of a human being, and that therefore we feel it our solemn duty , as the court of last resort , to thoroughly investigate the whole case , so far as it has been brought within the grasp and purview of this court , in order that we may justly and impartially ascertain whether or not substantial justice has been done in the premises by the court below . And in doing this, we have not confined ourselves to the point sub- mitted for our consideration by the counsellors , with respect to the legality or illegality of the judgment of the lower court , but we have extended our investigations to the facts surrounding the case , in order that we may ascertain , in the first place, whether the judgment which is now sought to be reversed , is founded upon a verdict substantially supported by the testimony of witnesses in the case ; for if the verdict is unsupported by the evidence , the judgment , which is simply the conclusion of the law upon the facts found or admitted , must crumble . And first let us inquire whom does the law regard as principals in the second degree to a felony , and then applying the law to the facts found by the jury , let us see whether those facts will legally constitute the crime which the jury found the accused guilty of, and if so , what punishment does the law attach thereto . The Statute of Liberia bearing on this point declares that "All persons actually present , aiding and abetting in any crime or misdemeanor described in the code , shall be amerced in a punishment not exceeding that inflicted upon the principal ," etc. ( Stat . Lib . appr . Jan. 24 , 1900. ) Now the crime which the accused was found guilty of committing as "principal in the second degree ," or, in the language of the statute , as "an aider and abetter ," is murder , the punishment for which , accord- ing to the provisions of the above cited act , is death by hanging , unless excusable . 419 The common law writers of both England and America lay down three requisites by which principals in the second degree are distinguished . The first is, they must be present; the second , they must be aiding and abetting in the felony ; the third , there must be a felonious intent to the felony . (I Arch . Crim . Prac . and Pleadings , pp . 58 , 59 ; I Bouv . Law . Dict . pp . 461 , 462. ) It should here be observed , that as regards the first requisite the statute requires an actual presence , but the rule of the common law is far more comprehensive and elastic , and admits of a constructive as well as actual presence . Thus, if A and B confederate to commit a certain felony and A approaches the scene , leaving B sufficiently near to render assistance if required , or B is left outside of a dwelling to watch and prevent surprise , while A enters the dwelling and perpetrates the felony which they both had assembled to perpetrate , though B is not an eye or ear witness to the transaction , the common law would regard him constructively present and hold him responsible as principal in the second degree . The reason that the law holds persons who aid and abet in the commission of felonies equally responsible as the actual agent , is founded upon the sound principle of justice and right . If the law held to the contrary , if a man after aiding and abetting in the commission of a crime could afterwards screen himself from punishment upon the ground that his was not the hand that actually did the deed , although he had in a measure participated in its perpetration , there would be a strong inducement , we fear , for men of felonious intentions to influence the weak - minded and reckless to become the actual agents of crimes the perpetration of which they them- selves have inspired , without any fear of being visited by the law . And therefore as a check a check upon such unscrupulous conduct , the law visits upon aiders and abetters to a felony the same punishment as that which 420 it inflicts upon the actual perpetrators . ( Stat . of Lib . 1900 , p . 6 ; I Bouv . Law Dict . pp . 460 , 461 : "Prin- cipals in the second degree ;" I Arch . Crim . Prac. and Pleadings , p . 62 , star p . 13. ) As we have already said , the judgment of a court is the conclusion of law upon facts found or admitted . In the case under consideration the facts found by the jury showed the accused guilty of murder as principal in the second degree . Neither the Statute of Liberia nor the common law adopted by this Republic recog- nizes any difference with respect to the punishment to be inflicted in such cases and that which is inflicted upon the actual agent or doer . Both are equally guilty and both are visited with the same sentence of the law. And therefore since the law of the land punishes with death by hanging the principal in the first degree in cases of murder , except excusable , and since principals in the second degree , or aiders and abetters , are sub- jected to the same punishment as their principals , the court below did not err in sentencing J. Nathaniel Skipper, the plaintiff in error , to be hanged. The judgment of the lower court is therefore hereby affirmed and the clerk of this court is hereby authorized to issue a mandate addressed to the judge of the court below , informing him of this decision . HOUSTON BROTHERS & COMPANY , Appellants , vs. E. A. CLINE OGOO , Appellee . [January Term , A. D. 1904.] Appeal from the Court of Quarter Sessions and Common Pleas , Montserrado County . Damages . The above entitled action is a cause that was entered in the Court of Quarter Sessions and Common Pleas , Montserrado County , at its December term, 1902 , sitting 421 in law , and purports to have been tried and determined by said court . In the court below E. A. Cline Ogoo was plaintiff and Houston Brothers & Company were defen- dants . Verdict was rendered by the jury in favor of plaintiff, whereupon the judge gave judgment for one thousand dollars as damages , and costs ; and upon its refusal to grant the defendants a new trial as asked for in a motion , they , the defendants , took exceptions to the judgment of the court and brought the case to this resort of legal judicature for a review of the cause , that substantial justice might be secured . The following , as far as the court can understand from the record of the case , is a synopsis of the history of the case : On the 16th day of July , A. D. 1900 , the appellants entered into contract with the appellee to the effect that the former agreed to employ the latter in the capacity of book - keeper for their firm on the conditions that appellee would receive for his service the sum of four hundred and eighty dollars annually , to be paid to him by appellants in equal monthly payments of forty dollars in sterling money of Great Britain ; that the appellee would be allowed by the appellants the sum of ten dollars per month in advance , over and above the stated salary of forty dollars , for and on account of his board and lodging ; that he , the appellee , would properly and efficiently keep the accounts of the firm of the said appellants , and have all accounts posted monthly , and quarterly balance sheets prepared ; that the appellee would hold himself subject to the orders and instruc- tions ( consistent with his work ) of appellants ; that appellee would attend office at the business place of appellants from the hours of 7 to II a . m ., and from 12.30 to 5 p.m. daily , Sundays excepted , unless pre- vented from so doing by sickness , and in the case of sickness , appellee would notify appellants . On viola- tion of the contract by either party , the violator would pay to the other party as fixed damages the sum of one thousand dollars in gold or silver coin . 422 The record shows that appellee entered an action against appellants for the recovery of one thousand dollars fixed damages , for the violation of the contract on the part of appellants , the first contracting party . As we have previously shown , the jury brought in a verdict that plaintiff , now appellee , was entitled to recover damages , whereupon the judge rendered his judgment awarding the plaintiff , now appellee , the sum of one thousand dollars in gold or silver coin as fixed damages ; to which judgment the defendants , now appel- lants , excepted and brought the cause before this tribunal . From a further review of the record we find that the evidence shows that appellee was absent from his work seven months , but that his absence was occasioned by sickness , of which he notified appellants . But there appears to be no evidence adduced by appellee to show that appellants had violated the contract by refusing to pay him, appellee , his regular salary, aside from his mere statement that appellants owed him, and also a letter from appellee to appellants asking for the pay of his salary. Appellee's simple assertion that appellants owed him and had violated the contract, in the mind of the court , is not evidence of the truth of the facts as complained of by appellee . Neither does the court find on record any evidence that appellee was a defaulter , otherwise than that he was ill for seven months , of which he gave appellants notice . Appellants ' assertion that appellee owed them , and that they did not owe appellee , in the mind of the court is not evidence that appellee owed them . Neither party has brought forth any legal evidence to support his or their position . The court below erred when it refused to admit in evidence the account book of appellants when it was offered , for possibly in that book might be found entries. in favor of appellants against appellee , or vice versa . The court below should have admitted the book in evi- 423 dence and appellants should have shown, independently of their books , evidence to substantiate the correctness of the entries therein made . There being no evidence in the case at all , the court is not in a position to award judgment in favor of either party ; and the verdict of the jury being manifestly against evidence , or founded upon no evidence at all , and the judgment of the court being based on said illegal verdict , renders both verdict and judgment void . This court therefore adjudges that the judgment of the court below is hereby reversed , and made null and void ; and that substantial justice may be meted out to the parties concerned , the court below is hereby ordered to resume jurisdiction and have a re-trial of the case , and in the meantime admit in evidence all books and papers which may have a tendency to prove or disprove the allega- tions. The clerk of the Supreme Court is commanded to issue a mandate to Judge C. T. O. King of the Court of Quarter Sessions and Common Pleas , Montserrado County , to the effect of this judgment , ordering him to execute this judgment at the March term ( 1904 ) of his court . RICHARD J. WILES , Appellant, vs. FLORENCE J. WILES, Appellee . [January Term , A. D. 1904. ] Appeal from the Court of Quarter Sessions and Common Pleas , Montserrado County . Partition - Homestead . A homestead set apart under and by virtue of the "Homestead and Household Exemption Act " answers to an estate in coparceny . The estate constituting such homestead cannot be devised while there are living heirs of the original householder . This case was brought in the equity jurisdiction of the Court of Quarter Sessions and Common Pleas of Montserrado County , at its March term 1903 , by 424 Florence J. Wiles , appellee ( petitioner inthe court below ) , upon a petition in equity, for the partition of certain real property ; to wit , lots 96 and 97, situated in the city of Monrovia , of which James T. Wiles , the father of appellee , was once seized , and which, during his residence thereon , that is to say, in May , 1899 , he had set apart from the rest of his estate as a homestead for himself and his family , agreeable with the Homestead Exemption Act of 1889 . The pleadings appear to have stopped here, but when the petition was called up for hearing , Richard J. Wiles , the appellant before this court , appeared by counsel and objected to the granting of said petition , upon the ground that the said property which constituted the subject-matter of the petition had been devised by the will of James T. Wiles unto Richard J. Wiles , the appel- lant , and W. S. Wiles , his brother . The court below overruled the objections of the appellant and rejected the claim sought to be set upon said property by virtue of the will of James T. Wiles , and gave the following decree in the premises , to wit : "That no one taking advantage of the said Home- stead Exemption Act can afterwards dispose of said property by will or otherwise without having first applied to a court having competent jurisdiction and annulling his said act with regard to said homestead . Therefore this court decrees that the said homestead of J. T. Wiles , viz . , lots 96 and 97 , be held by the said Florence J. Wiles and Richard J. Wiles , heirs of the said J. T. Wiles , equally between them, as they are the only surviving heirs of J. T. Wiles .' To this decree appellant excepted and has brought the case before this tribunal for review . It having been admitted in the arguments by the learned counsels , first , that the said J. T. Wiles did place the estate in question under the Homestead Ex- emption Act , and secondly, that the said J. T. Wiles 425 did afterwards devise said estate unto his two sons , W. S. and Richard J. Wiles , there remains no question. on the facts averred on both sides for this court to con- sider, and therefore we proceed to examine and construe the law bearing on the case . To enable us to consider systematically the several doctrines of law involved , we deem it convenient to arrange the case under the follow- ing heads : 1. What is the legal status of an estate upon which a homestead has been declared under the Homestead Exemption law of the country ? 2. Who are the parties whom the statute contem- plates shall enjoy an interest and derive a benefit out of a homestead estate ? 3. What kind of an estate , as between the parties interested , does a homestead create ? 4. Does an ancestor or "head of family" who may place property under the above cited act still retain an absolute fee therein ? 5. If not, can he at his option alienate such an estate. by will or otherwise ? Before going further we would remark that the law of homestead exemption is of comparatively recent origin . Anterior to the last century this species of real estate was unknown to the law . It is one of the two great doctrines which have been introduced into the law during the nineteenth century and which have marked the development of the legal science in the United States . This species of real property was first brought forward under the constitution and statutory enactments of Texas , when it existed as a separate and distinct Repub- lic . A doctrine founded upon such a sound and judicious basis , instituted not for the purpose of encouraging and stimulating a tendency to fraud , but, on the contrary , with a view to protecting the honest and upright land- holder against failures in the ordinary affairs of life ,— failures which may at any moment dispossess the honest 426 but unfortunate landholder and his family of a home ,- could not fail to commend itself , and hence we find that in the United States of America the doctrine was readily taken up and state after state passed statutes adopting it, with such modifications as were deemed suitable to their respective conditions . In 1889 , the Legislature of Liberia passed an act en- titled , "The Homestead and Household Exemption Act ." Section I of said act reads as follows : "That from and after the passage of this act all householders and heads of families , owning real estate , shall have so much of that real estate exempt from the writs of their creditors , that is to say, one town lot or one acre of farm land upon which the house is situated , with all the appurte- nances and out-dwellings of same , which exemption shall mean the homestead of the family, and this exemption shall last as long as any of the heirs of the family so occu- pying it shall live." (Act Leg . Lib . 1889. ) This is practically the law controlling this case . The language of the above cited act conveys to the mind of the court the idea that property set aside by the head of a family as a homestead for himself and family creates an estate in which all parties connected with and forming a part of said family, within the meaning and purview of said act , acquire an interest and a share therein . The object of the lawmakers in passing this statute , which enables a householder to take out of market a limited portion of his real and personal property , and to have the same secured against the claims of his creditors , appears to be not only for the purpose that the head of the family shall have secured unto him an unassailable estate , but also that the wife and children , forming a part of said family , shall likewise take an estate therein , which cannot be set aside or destroyed , either by their own acts or by the acts of him who first held an absolute fee therein , or by the claims of third parties against any of the tenants thereto . And 427 this view is upheld by the terms of a subsequent statute , which makes it a misdemeanor for either the clerk of court to issue , or the sheriff to serve , any writ upon a homestead estate . (Act Leg . Lib . 1897. ) Undoubtedly this statute was not passed to screen property held in fee by debtors against the writs of their creditors . But it is because the putting an estate under the Home- stead and Household Exemption Act creates an estate in coparcenary among all the parties constituting and forming the family, within the meaning of the original act, that this statute forbids all interference with it by the officers of the law . To hold to the contrary , we think , would be to declare this statute fraudulent and pernicious . It was insisted upon by the learned counsel for the appellant , that James T. Wiles placed the property under review under the Homestead Act after Florence J. and Richard J. Wiles had attained their majority , and that therefore they could not be looked upon as con- stituting a part of the family at the time said property was homesteaded . The court would remark here , that there was no evidence submitted to support this state- ment , but supposing there had been , we could not have upheld the proposition . The unequivocal intention of the lawmakers , so far as we can draw from the language of the act , was , as we have said , to create an estate in perpetuity for the family. The last paragraph of the Act of 1889 reads : "This exemption shall last as long as any of the heirs of the family so occupying it shall live." Let us suppose that Florence J. and Richard J. Wiles were not living in the family at the time the property was homesteaded , yet would they not acquire a title therein by virtue of being heirs of the original head of the family and occupant ? And if there survives any of the heirs of the original head of the family, would not the homestead remain in full force and virtue ? The statute contemplates a lapse of a homestead estate only 428 after the heirs of the original " head " and occupant have become extinct . aware that the statutes of some of the American states enunciate a somewhat different prin- ciple , but in this case it is the lex scripta of the country and not the statutes of foreign states which is the con- trolling law. We have already shown that a homestead under the laws of Liberia is an estate in which the wife and chil- dren constituting the family, hold an undivided interest therein . Such an estate could not be regarded as an estate in joint tenancy , as was suggested by one of the counsel , for an estate in joint tenancy is one acquired by purchase and is not subjected in all respects to the rule of descent . This species of tenancy is governed by the subtle principle of survivorship , which does not apply to homestead estates . Equally so , nor would the law regard it an estate in common , because the title thereto is not distinct and several ; nor an estate in fee tail , because in homestead estates the wife acquires and holds an equal interest therein with the heirs of the original householder , whereas in fee tail the title is reserved to the "heirs of the body" only of him last seized . By analogy of the law of real property we find that a homestead under the laws of Liberia answers to an estate in coparcenary . The three units which the law demands to establish such estate , namely , time , title , and possession , are to be found in this species of property . Let us now consider whether James T. Wiles , the original householder , had a legal right to devise the homestead created by himself or not, and we may here observe that it is upon this point chiefly that appellant rested his case. We have already endeavored to show what kind of an estate a homestead estate is , and who the parties are that acquire interest therein , by force of the law of 429 the country . If our conclusions are supported by the law of real property and the Homestead and Household Exemption Act of Liberia , and we do not hesitate to say that we feel that they are , then it follows as a legal consequence , that the property in question cannot be disposed of by will . If James T. Wiles and his family held the property in question as a homestead , it could not afterwards be devised , as long as the heirs existed , without setting aside an inflexible rule of the law of real property . "A man cannot dispose of the rights of other parties ." "He who would be generous must first be just." Having traversed the grounds of the whole case , we conclude by saying that the will of James T. Wiles , devising lots 96 and 97, cannot take the property from under the exemption where it had been legally placed . Nor can the will destroy or in any wise annul the force of the homestead , or create a new and distinct estate while there are living heirs of James T. Wiles , the original householder and occupant . The judgment of the court below is therefore affirmed and the clerk is hereby authorized to issue a mandate to the judge of the court below , informing him of this decision .
Selected judicial document
Skipper v. Republic
Supreme Court of Liberia