1 LLR 401
Source-verified historic case report · Volume I
The printed reporter identifies this case at 1 LLR 401. Source pages 401–413 (PDF pages 411–423). Term: [January Term , A. D. 1903. ].
This transcription comes from the preserved PDF text layer. Its source caption and page boundaries were checked against the printed reporter, but the transcription has not been independently proofread against every scanned page. Refer to the scanned original for quotations.
401 W. S. DUNN , TOM COFFEE , JOHNSON & MOSES , Appellants , vs. REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA, Appellee . [January Term , A. D. 1903. ] Appeal from the Court of Quarter Sessions and Common Pleas , Grand Bassa County . Criminal law-Expert testimony -Burden of proof-Dying declaration. To qualify a person to give expert medical testimony , he must show that he holds a diploma or certificate from a medical college that he is a physician . In criminal cases , the prosecution must prove guilt beyond a rational doubt . A declaration made ten days before death , during which interval a per- son appears to be in usual health, does not constitute a dying declaration . This case is brought before this court upon an appeal from the Court of Quarter Sessions and Common Pleas of Grand Bassa County . The appellants ( defendants in the court below ) were indicted by the Grand Jurors of the aforesaid County , and tried at the March term of the said court , 1902 , for the atrocious crime of murder . Upon arraignment the appellants plead "not guilty" to the charge. A jury was empanelled to try the issue raised by said plea, who , after hearing the evidence , returned a verdict finding the appellants guilty of "murder in the second degree ." The appellants ob- jected to the verdict , and on the 4th day of April during the said session of said court , moved the court below for a new trial . The court overruled said motion and proceeded to pronounce sentence against said appellants , whereby each and all of them were condemned to twenty years ' imprisonment . To this judgment , as well as to the other rulings of the court below in the premises , the appellants excepted and have brought the case before this court upon a bill of exceptions , for review . Having thus briefly stated the case we shall now pro- ceed to consider the several points laid in appellants' bill of exceptions . The first exception laid is founded 402 upon a query put to witness C. C. Brown , for the prose- cution , touching a conversation had between witness and deceased ; the appellants taking as their ground that the question related to matters which were “ hear- say." By referring to the record we find that that part of the testimony of witness Brown, objected to by appellants ' attorney , related to a conversation held with the deceased some time before the commission of the crime for which the appellants are charged . Applying this conversation to the res gesta or subject matter of the charge, we find no chain of connection between them . This court holds that that part of the evidence of witness Brown was irrelevant to the issue and there- fore was not proper evidence to be submitted to the jury . The court below erred in overruling appellants ' objection on this point and admitting that portion of witness ' testimony as evidence . The second exception is to the admission of the testi- mony of witness A. L. Moore . From inspection of the record this court further finds that the evidence of witness Moore was disconnected with the charge alleged against appellants and did not tend in any way to substantiate any of the allegations set forth in the indictment . This evidence being irrelevant , was also illegal and ought not to have been submitted to the jury , to substantiate allegations to which it did not profess to refer . This court is of the opinion that the court below erred in admitting said testimony . The third exception raises a question of considerable importance . We have endeavored to carefully examine the facts and to apply the law bearing thereon . The exception is taken as follows , to wit : "Because when on the second day of April , 1902 , State's attorney intro- duced upon the stand one T. I. Tate , to testify in this case as a medical expert, prisoners objected to the witness on the ground that said witness was not a legally qualified physician , your honor overruled said objection ," etc. 403 The record shows that some time after the death and burial of the deceased , the body was exhumed and a post mortem examination made by witness Tate , in the capacity of a physician . The record also shows that the investigation made by witness upon the dead body , together with his conclusions drawn from said investi- gation, were afterwards submitted to the jury as evi- dence against the accused . The questions which present themselves to the mind of the court in considering this evidence are : First , Was the witness such a person as the law would presume to be possessed of sufficient knowledge of the science of medicine to enable him to make a correct and scientific examination of the deceased , and to arrive at a just conclusion as to the cause of death ? Second , Was proof of his qualification made out at the trial ? Third , Could his evidence be received as that of a medical expert in the absence of such proof? We would observe that while , owing to the peculiar conditions of the country , persons inspired with a desire to alleviate the physical sufferings of our communities may take upon themselves the duties of a physician , and from a long and perhaps successful practice , may acquire the appellation of medi- cal men , yet when it comes to giving evidence as a medi- cal expert before a court of justice , evidence which may involve the life or liberty of a man , the law is careful that none shall be allowed to exercise this right who has not acquired his knowledge of medicine and the right to practice as a physician in a proper and legal manner . It would be extremely dangerous did the law admit of a reverse rule . Persons possessing no adequate knowl- edge of the science of medicine , and perhaps devoid of moral restraint, might come into court and give evidence as experts , upon which the jury might arrive at con- clusions that would involve life or liberty. Mr. Bouvier defines medical evidence to be , testimony given by physicians or surgeons in their professional 404 capacity as experts , or derived from the statements of writers of medical or surgical works . (II Bouv. Law Dict . p . 171 : "Medical Evidence .") It was insisted by the attorney for the prosecution in the court below , that the witness having for a long time practiced medicine and having also served the State in a military expedition , as physician , this was evidence of his general character as a medical man . We cannot agree with this contention. The fact that witness had practiced as a medical man for a considerable time does not, in the opinion of this court, establish the fact of his qualification as a physician , to enable him to depose to matters of medical science . It is not prima facie evidence of his qualification as such . There is no evidence in the record to show that witness proved he held a diploma or certificate from any medical college or institution to this effect . The record , rather , shows the contrary . It is therefore the opinion of this court that witness Tate was not such a person as the law regards as competent to give evidence as a medical expert in a trial for murder . The court below therefore erred in admitting said witness as a medical expert. Passing over the fourth point in the bill of exceptions , which we do not deem essential to our conclusions in the case , we now proceed to consider the fifth and sixth points in said bill . From further inspection of the record we find that the jury having returned a verdict of guilt against the prisoners, their counsel tendered a motion , praying the judge of the court below to award prisoners a new trial , on the ground that said verdict was contrary to the law and evidence in the case ; which motion the court below overruled , and subsequently , that is to say, on the 4th day of April , 1902 , pronounced sentence against the prisoners . We feel no hesitancy in saying that there was a palpable misapplication of the law on evidence by the court below . We have examined with consider- 405 able diligence the evidence produced at the trial by the prosecution , but have failed to discover such legal evi- dence as could warrant the jury in arriving at the con- clusion of guilt . It is a well settled principle in criminal law, that "every one is presumed to be innocent until the contrary is proven ." It is also an established rule , that the onus probandi , or burden of proof , rests upon him who maintains the affirmative , and although there are instances where the burden of proof shifts , as where the prisoner attempts to justify, the case under con- sideration does not fall within the exception to the general rule . And , says Mr. Archbold , where the plea of the defendant is "not guilty," the prosecution must prove defendant guilty of the charge before the latter can be called upon for his defence . (I Arch . Crim . Pleadings , p . 359. ) And the prosecution must prove it beyond a rational doubt . In civil cases the jury may decide according to the preponderance of evidence , but in criminal cases-cases affecting life or liberty — the evi- dence must be so conclusive as to exclude every rational doubt of prisoner's guilt ; for if, after hearing all the evidence , the mind of the jury is in such condition that it cannot say it feels a moral certainty of the truth of the charge, then there arises a doubt , which must operate in favor of the accused . In the case under consideration we find that the cause of death was not made out by the prosecution , at the trial , with that degree of certainty that the law requires , and this , we would observe , was material to lay a founda- tion of guilt . There is no evidence to prove that from the pressure made upon the deceased , by one of the prisoners , she , within a reasonable time thereafter , became sick and , languishing , died . There is no evi- dence to prove that prisoners actually inflicted the injuries upon the deceased , that constitute the body of the crime , as laid in the indictment . On the contrary , it was given in evidence that the deceased was in unusual 406 health thereafter ; that she went about performing physi- cal labor , such as one could not perform who had received an injury sufficient to cause abortion ; and that about eighteen days elapsed from the time the affray occurred , to the death of the deceased . It was also stated that subsequent to said affray , deceased committed acts that could have produced abortion , and that one of these acts, namely , sewing on the machine , was done the day before the abortion occurred , which led to her death . It was also not clearly established whether the deceased actually came to her death from the mere fact of the abortion , or whether it was not due to the malpractice of the mid -wife , who , according to her own statement , failed to deliver or extract the placenta and to do such other acts the neglect of which might produce death . It was strenuously argued by the learned counsel for the prosecution , that the declarations made by deceased to witness Mrs. Hall and others concerning the cause of her death , should be taken as the dying declaration of the deceased . Let us see if this is well founded . The general principle on which this species of evidence is admitted-observes Mr. Archbold- is that they are declarations in extremity , when the party is at the point of death , and every hope of this world is gone ; when every motive to falsehood is silenced and the mind is induced by the most powerful considerations to speak the truth . (I Arch . Crim . Prac. and Pleadings , p. 428 , note .) It does not appear to the satisfaction of this court that the declaration of the deceased was made at such time, and under such circumstances , as to con- stitute in law a dying declaration . Witness Mrs. Ware stated that the deceased made the declaration to her on the evening after the affray between prisoners and the deceased occurred . Witness Mrs. Crummada stated that there was a lapse of about ten days between the death of the deceased and the day she made the declaration to her. During these intervals , it was given in evidence , 407 the deceased appeared to be in usual health and attended to her duties and even attended a church conference . Witness Mrs. Hall stated that deceased continued to make this declaration to persons who came to see her up to the time of her death , but it will be noticed that this testimony of witness Hall is unsupported by the evidence of the other witnesses . Having well sifted the evidence and carefully con- sidered the law bearing on this case , the court holds that the court below erred in not setting the verdict aside and awarding prisoners a new trial . And this court further holds that the judgment rendered in the court below is illegal in that it is founded upon a verdict unsup- ported by the evidence in the case . For the foregoing reasons this court reverses said judgment of the court below , and the clerk of this court is hereby authorized to issue a mandate informing the judge of the court below of this decision . G. BERLIN , Agent for J. W. West , Appellant, vs. THE REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA , Appellee . [January Term , A. D. 1903. ] Appeal from the Court of Quarter Sessions and Common Pleas , Grand Bassa County . Violation of Revenue Laws-Evidence-Intent . A person who goes to a place in the Republic of Liberia , where for- eigners cannot reside for the purpose of trading , builds a house , putting in shelving and counters , does not by such act alone violate the revenue laws . Such act is not sufficient evidence to show an intent to violate such laws . At the July term , 1902 , of the Court of Quarter Ses- sions and Common Pleas , Grand Bassa County , the above entitled cause was tried and determined , but has subsequently been brought up to this court by appellant on a bill of exceptions , for review . A brief history of the case is as follows : A libel was filed in the Court of Quarter Sessions and Common Pleas , Grand Bassa 408 County , sitting in admiralty , July , 1902 , on the part of the Republic of Liberia , by Edward W. Liles , Collector of Customs for Grand Bassa , against G. Berlin , agent for J. W. West , a merchant of Hamburg, Germany , transacting mercantile business in the County of Grand Bassa , for violating the navigation , commerce and revenue laws of the Republic of Liberia , by going to a place on the Liberian coast in the territory of Liberia , called Grand Colloh , not a port of entry and delivery , locating himself at said place for the purpose of trading , with intent in so doing to contravene the navigation , commerce and revenue laws of the Republic of Liberia , and for the actual violation of the said revenue law by beginning to trade by buying produce and importing goods , wares and merchandises into the said place of Grand Colloh , not a port of entry and delivery . Witnesses were sworn and caused to depose , to prove or disprove the allegations as laid in the libel-five on the part of libellant, now appellee , and one on the part of libellee , now appellant . After the deposing of the witnesses , the judge of said court proceeded to render the following decree : "In this case the Republic of Liberia charges G.Berlin , agent for J. W. West at Grand Colloh , with going to the aforesaid place for the purpose of trading , and also that the said libellee did trade at the said point known as Grand Colloh , to which the said libellee plead not guilty ; and whereas after a careful examination of the witnesses pro and con , and after maturely considering the subject, the court finds that the said G. Berlin , agent for J. W. West as aforesaid , did leave Lower Buchanan and go to Grand Colloh for the purpose of trading , in contraven- tion and violation of the port of entry laws of the Repub- lic of Liberia , he knowing the said point to be a place where foreigners cannot reside for the purpose of trading , or in any way doing any kind of mercantile business ; but notwithstanding the act of trading was not com- 409 pleted , still the court decides that the fact of the libel- lee's leaving the port of Lower Buchanan and going to Grand Colloh , a place not a port of entry, and super- intending the preparation of a factory house , which was being carried on by a certain carpenter employed by J. W. West , is a sufficient indication of the intention of libellee to violate the law . Therefore the court adjudges, orders and decrees , that the said G. Berlin , agent for J. W. West as aforesaid , pay a fine of eight hundred dollars immediately , with all costs and expenses connected with the case , or in default of paying said fine , costs and expenses , to be imprisoned in the com- mon jail of this country for a term of sixteen calendar months , or until he shall pay the said fine , costs and other expenses before the expiration of said term , at which time he shall be released from further confine- ment." To the above decree and other rulings of the judge below , the libellee , now appellant , excepted and appealed to this jurisdiction for a review of the case . This court says that it has well considered and in a legal way digested all the proceedings and facts con- nected with the case , and is now prepared to come to a righteous and impartial decision . In the libel , the libellee , now appellant , is not only charged with going to Grand Colloh with the intent to contravene the revenue laws of the Republic of Liberia , but also that he did contravene the said laws by beginning to trade , buying produce and importing goods , wares and merchandise into the said place . Now, upon inspection of the record the court does not find a shadow of evidence to sustain the charge of an overt act by trading at and importing goods , etc. , into the said place of Grand Colloh ; nor is there any to prove that it was libellee's intention to contravene the revenue laws of the Republic . The only evidence that has a semblance of proof that it was his purpose to trade at that place in question is, the witness 410 said that he , libellee , said that he had gone to Grand Colloh to watch A. Woerman , and that if he , Woerman , traded at that place , and the Liberian Government said nothing about it, he , libellee , would trade there also . And the court further says, that the mere act of going to Grand Colloh , building a house and putting windows , counters and shelves in it, is not sufficient evidence in law to prove an intent to violate the laws , or that he had violated the revenue laws . Now, then , without further consideration , this court adjudges that the rulings and decree of the judge below are not well founded , and that they are hereby reversed and that the appellant recover all legal costs in this action . The clerk is hereby ordered to send a mandate to the judge below to the effect of this judgment . JACOB WEST , Agent for J. W. West , Appellant , vs. THE REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA, Appellee . [January Term , A. D. 1903. ] Appeal from the Court of Quarter Sessions and Common Pleas, Grand Bassa County . Violation of Revenue Laws . An exporter of articles of African produce does not violate the revenue laws where he exports such articles without permit, when such permit is asked for, fee tendered and refused by the customs authorities . This case was tried in the admiralty jurisdiction of the Court of Quarter Sessions and Common Pleas , for Grand Bassa County , at its June term , A. D. 1902. The appel- lant was libelled by the Republic of Liberia , libellant , for violating the revenue laws by exporting sundry articles of African produce from said County , without first obtaining a permit from the Collector of Customs for the privilege of so doing . Upon the case being called up , the appellant plead "not guilty" to the charge . The court below having heard the evidence pro and con in the case , on the fifth day of August of the aforesaid year, 411 delivered its decree , by which appellant was condemned to pay to the appellee the sum of twelve hundred dollars and costs . The appellant , being dissatisfied with said decree , excepted thereto , as well as to other rulings of the court in the premises , and has brought the case before this court upon an appeal . By reference to the record in the case we observe that the questions involved are chiefly as follows : Firstly , Had the Secretary of the Treasury legal authority to issue instructions and regulations requiring that per- mits be obtained from Collector of Customs by shippers of African produce prior to the shipping thereof ? Sec- ondly , Did the regulation in question contain a penalty for the violation thereof , or does the statute upon which it is founded supply that want ? and Thirdly , Did appel- lant violate this regulation ? The Statutes of Liberia " establishing the Treasury Department and defining the duties of the same ," pro- vide as follows : " The Secretary of the Treasury shall , with the approbation of the President , have power to make and issue from time to time such instructions , rules and regulations , to the several collectors and all other receivers of public money-the treasurer and sub- treasurers as to the manner of performing their duties , and as to the rendition of their accounts and returns to the department , as may to him seem best calculated to promote the public interest ." ( Acts Leg . of Lib . 1858 , p . 36 , sec . 7. ) By a subsequent enactment of the Legis- lature of Liberia , the power of the Secretary of the Treasury in this relation has been confirmed . He may issue regulations touching the collectors of customs , and his regulations , when not repugnant to the law of the land , are enforceable as law . ( Acts Leg . of Lib . approved Feb. 1, 1900. ) This court is firmly of the opinion that the statutes above referred to confer upon the Secretary of the Treas- ury the power and right to issue from time to time such 412 regulations with respect to the management of the cus- toms as the public interest may demand . As to the second proposition , the court would observe that it does not appear from the record that the regula- tion of the Secretary of the Treasury with respect to permits , which regulation appellant is charged with vio- lating , contains a penalty for the violation thereof . Nor do the statutes above cited contain a clause providing a penalty for persons who may export produce without first obtaining a permit . This, we would remark , was essential ; for, as Mr. Blackstone observes , the main strength and force of the law consists in the penalty annexed to it. (I Blk. Com. star page 57 . The fourth section of the Act of 1900 , above cited , which appears to be the authority upon which the court below predicated its decree , could not , it is the opinion of this court , be construed to apply to cases for the violation of revenue law by failing to obtain a permit to export produce , which is the nature of the case under consideration . We now proceed to consider our third and last propo- sition . It appears from the record that libellee was charged in the libel field against him in this suit , with defiantly , persistently and unlawfully exporting from the port of Grand Bassa , nine boat - loads of African produce without first obtaining permits from the Collector of Customs to ship ; although said libellee was duly re- quested so to do , he failed and refused to comply with the customs regulations of this Republic . Let us see whether these allegations were proved at the trial or not . The evidence of the Collector of Cus- toms , as well as that of the wharfinger whom the court would presume to be the best evidence in a suit of this nature , does not prove that libellee " defiantly , per- sistently and unlawfully " failed and refused to apply for a permit to ship on the day mentioned in the libel . The question was put to witness Liles , the Collector of 413 Customs, by the attorney for the defence , as follows : "Did Mr. West , the appellant , apply to your office for a permit ?" To this query the witness replied , "I am not positive ; if he did , I refused him ." It was also given in evidence by the wharfinger that appellant's clerk offered him , previous to shipping as aforesaid, the fee charged for permits , which fee he , the wharfinger , refused to accept , upon the ground that he had received instruc- tions from the Collector of Customs not to allow appel- lant to ship . It was also stated in evidence by the same witness , that it was customary for appellant to pay him the fee charged for permits , and that the Collector of Customs had on previous occasions accepted the same from him in favor of appellant for permits . The evi- dence further shows that appellant sent his clerk to the customs department prior to shipping as aforesaid , and that the Collector was not there in his office . And further , it was stated that the said produce , excepting the coffee , was shipped under the eye and with the knowledge of the wharfinger . From the circumstances surrounding this case , as well as the light thrown on it by the prosecution's own wit- nesses , this court is firmly of the opinion that the charge alleged against the appellant was not substantially proved at the trial , and this court has vainly sought to discover the evidence and the law upon which the decree of the court below is founded . The judgment of the court below is therefore reversed and the clerk of this court is hereby authorized to issue a mandate informing the judge of the court below of this decision .
Selected judicial document
Dunn et als. v. Republic
Supreme Court of Liberia