1 LLR 347
Source-verified historic case report · Volume I
The printed reporter identifies this case at 1 LLR 347. Source pages 347–358 (PDF pages 357–368). Term: [January Term , A. D. 1900. ].
This transcription comes from the preserved PDF text layer. Its source caption and page boundaries were checked against the printed reporter, but the transcription has not been independently proofread against every scanned page. Refer to the scanned original for quotations.
347 HILARY J. MOORE , H. R. W. JOHNSON and BEV- ERLY Y. PAYNE , surviving executors of the late firm of G. Moore & Son , of Monrovia , Appellants , vs. LEWIS SOLOMON of Liverpool , transacting mer- cantile business under the firm name and style of Lionel Hart & Co. , Appellee . [January Term , A. D. 1900. ] Appeal from the Court of Quarter Sessions and Common Pleas , Montserrado County . Bill in Equity for relief against fraud . Where after the death of a sole partner a new business was started under the name and style of the old firm , which by will was allowed , but the transactions were carried on for the sole benefit of the new partnership and was in no respect a continuation of the original firm , in a suit brought against the executors of the original firm to recover monies advanced the new partnership , upon the ground that the name of the firm was the same and that one of the executors of the original firm was the managing partner of the new firm , it was held that the suit could not be maintained against the executors of the original firm in the absence of proof showing that in that capacity the debt had been created by one or more of the executors . It was also held that the use of the original firm's name , where it had been allowed , did not constitute fraud unless it could be shown that the partners of the new firm misrepresented themselves , and that under a delusion with respect to the real members of the new firm , caused by their misrepresentations , credit had been given which otherwise would not have been given. This case is before this court upon an appeal from the judgment rendered in the Court of Quarter Sessions and Common Pleas , Montserrado County . At the trial of the cause in the court below , the counsels representing the parties in the case , with the view to shorten the proceedings and to put the case before the court below in a concise manner, admitted certain points relative to the facts and submitted the following queries to the court for its consideration , to wit : Query 1. "Were Lionel Hart & Co. misled by the executors of G. Moore as to the status of the firm of G. Moore ?" Query 2. "Ought Lionel Hart & Co. to lose the money ?" Query 3. "If not, who is responsible for payment , the executors as trustees of the late firm , or in their individual capacity 348 as private persons ? Can the debtor obtain payment out of the property of the late G. Moore , or not ?" The arguments on these points having been heard , the court below decreed in favor of the plaintiff, now appellee , as follows : "That Lionel Hart & Co. shall recover from the estate of G. Moore the sum of two thousand two hundred and sixty-nine dollars and ten cents , with accrued interest and costs ." To this judgment the defendants , now appellants , expected and have brought the case before this court upon an appeal , for review . After a careful examination of the evidence in the case and a careful research into the law applicable thereto , we have deliberately arrived at the conclusions , First , that it does not appear from the records that there has been fraud practiced upon Lionel Hart & Co. , appel- lee , by the executors of the estate of G. Moore , nor any of them , in their capacity as such . Secondly , that the executors of said estate in their capacity as such cannot be made answerable and responsible to Lionel Hart & Co. , appellee , for the payment of a debt not contracted by them jointly , nor by any one of them under color and by virtue of his executorship . And thirdly , that the estate of the late G. Moore now vested in the devisees mentioned in the will of the testator , cannot be held to pay a debt not created in the lifetime of the testator , nor by his executors after his death . From the record in the case we find that G. Moore , who at the time of his death was the sole partner of the late firm of G. Moore & Son , made provision in his last. will and testament for the continuance of his business after his death , should his sons so elect ; that acting under this provision of said will Samuel Ford Moore , Hilary John Moore and Urias A. Moore , sons of the said testator , conducted mercantile business under the name and style of G. Moore & Son , in which business the said Hilary J. Moore appears to have acted as manager or agent ; that for the sole benefit and trade of said firm , Hilary J. 349 Moore in his capacity as agent for said firm and not as an executor of the estate of G. Moore , contracted the debt which Lionel Hart & Co. , appellee in this suit, seeks to recover . Before proceeding further we would observe , that from the business letters that were written to said appellee by H. J. Moore as the agent of said firm , as well as from the entire conduct of said firm towards the appellee , we have discovered no grounds upon which to draw a legal inference of an intent to commit either positive or con- structive fraud . Nor do the said communications dis- close the fact that means of cunning , deception or artifice were employed to induce Lionel Hart & Co. , appellee , to deal with and credit said firm , at any time , or in any wise to mislead said firm. It does appear that at the time the debt was contracted , the said firm of G. Moore & Son , of which H. J. Moore was acting agent , did really exist and was actually conducting mercantile business at Monrovia under the name and style of G. Moore & Son . "Courts of equity, sitting to decide whether or not a transaction be fraudulent , will be governed by the cir- cumstances surrounding the case and the intent of the party, which intent is to be inferred from the circum- stances ; it is generally held to be a part of the equity doctrine of fraud not to define it ; not to lay down any rule as to the nature of it , lest the craft of men should find ways of committing fraud which might escape the rules of such limit or definition . But it is also held that to constitute fraud there must exist artifice , decep- tion , or cheat ." We shall now consider our second proposition . It was impliedly expressed in one of the queries submitted for the consideration of the court below , that the executors of the estate of G. Moore & Son having stood by and allowed the transaction to go on , cannot absolve them- selves from responsibility to third parties , who by their negligence have been misled ; and this position was main- 350 tained by the counsel conducting the defence , in his arguments . We would state as a general rule , that ordinarily an executor is responsible when there is negligence or im- proper conduct in administering an estate , and that for all maladministration or mismanagement of the estate the executor is liable in a court of equity . But Judge Story observes in his learned treatise on Contracts , "Courts are , however , extremely liberal in respect to executors and will not render them liable on slight and trivial grounds ." (Story on Contracts , p . 335 , sec . 289. ) In the case under review the executors of the late G. Moore & Son's estate cannot be held responsible (as executors ) to Lionel Hart & Co. , appellee , for the debt he seeks to recover , nor can the said estate be made answerable for the payment thereof , for the foregoing reasons . It is the opinion of this court , therefore , that the court below erred in ruling that Lionel Hart & Co. shall recover from the estate of G. Moore & Son the debt sued for by appellee , with interest and costs , and this court hereby reverses the said judgment of the court below . And this court further says that in order that substantial justice may be meted out in all the premises to all parties concerned , and the appellee obtain the relief to which he is entitled , this court , recognizing its authority con- ferred by law in matters of appeal to give such judg- ment as the court below ought to have given , when there are good grounds for reversal , will proceed to the rendition of its decision in the case . This court decrees that H. J. Moore , the surviving partner of the firm lastly conducting mercantile business in the city of Monrovia under the name and style of "G. Moore & Son," in whom by operation of the last will and testament of G. Moore the contingent remainders of the estate devised to Samuel Ford Moore and Urias A. Moore , his co-partners, have vested , and who is presumed 351 in law to be in possession of the assets of the said firm with whom and for whose sole benefit the debt sued for by appellee was contracted , shall pay unto Lewis Solo- mon of Liverpool , transacting mercantile business under the firm name and style of Lionel Hart & Co. , appellee , the full and just sum of two thousand two hundred and sixty-nine dollars and ten cents ( $ 2,269.10 ) for his debt , with interest thereon and costs . And the clerk of this court is hereby authorized to issue a mandate to the judge of the court below , informing him of this decree . ROBERT T. SHERMAN , Appellant, vs. JOSHUA PHILIPS , A. B. STUBBLEFIELD and R. H. HILL, Trustees of Providence Baptist Church , Monrovia , Appellees . [January Term , A. D. 1900. ] Appeal from the Court of Quarter Sessions and Common Pleas , Montserrado County . Ejectment . This suit was brought by appellees as trustees of the Baptist Church to recover possession of property devised by Robert R. Johnson to said Church . The first paragraph of the will relating to the property, devised the estate to said Church subject to the provision that should the wife of the testator , who was made sole executrix , have need to dispose of the estate during her lifetime for her support , etc. , she was at liberty to do so. Another paragraph in the will gave the wife the right to sell without mentioning the happening of the contingency mentioned in the pre- vious paragraph , and also to lease or give the property to any person or persons around her that she might deem fit. Held , that the first paragraph devised a contingent legacy to the wife liable to the enjoyment of a fee title, should her need , the contingency , happen ; that in case the contingency did not arise during the life- time of the wife , the fee vested in the said Baptist Church to whom was devised in said will a contingent remainder in said estate . It was also held that where the language of a will is ambiguous and its provisions conflicting , the real intention of the testator is to be ascertained and the will construed so as to admit of what was really meant by the testator . This court has so often enunciated the principles of law governing actions of ejectment , which is but an 352 action to try and determine the ownership of real prop- erty, that it would only be repeating itself to indulge in anything like amplification . The claims of the adverse claimants to lot No. 65 in the city of Monrovia , being found in the wills and testa- ments of the late Robert R. Johnson and that of Mrs. I. B. Johnson , the widow of the said R. R. Johnson , both of whom executed their wills and testaments handed in as evidence , have had the special attention of this court . The will of the late Robert R. Johnson contains several legacies and to several legatees . But that which concerns us at present is the devise of the testator to the Providence Baptist Church, Monrovia , and that part of said will which refers to the late I. B. Johnson , sole executrix of the will of her husband and trustee of his real estate. The following is the language employed by the testa- tor : "I give and bequeath to my beloved wife , I. B. Johnson , all my real and personal estate that I have after my demise , except such part as I may dispose of in my lifetime ; and after the death of my wife , I. B. Johnson , I bequeath my dwelling house in the city of Monrovia (providing that she doesn't have need to sell it in her lifetime ) ; it is to go to the Providence Baptist Church ; it is not to be sold after her death , but to be leased or rented out by the church for the benefit of the said church , and one third of the proceeds of the rent is to be kept for repairs of said house , and the other two thirds is to go for the benefit of the said Baptist Church ." The above is the paragraph in said will referring to the Providence Baptist Church , Monrovia , the appellee before this court . We now quote that part of the will referring to the rights of Mrs. I. B. Johnson , legatee and sole executrix of the testator R. R. Johnson . The lan- guage here employed is as follows : "I appoint my wife I. B. Johnson's advisers , R. T. Sherman and M. T. Worrell . Notwithstanding the above decree , my wife 353 I. B. Johnson is at liberty to sell , lease , or rent any part or parcel of the whole of my estate for her own use, to give to any person or persons around her that she may see fit." To harmonize these two provisions of the will we have had no little trouble in finding out the intention of the divisor , and to accomplish this we have been compelled to set aside the ambiguous and superfluous words . This court says , a will being considered as an instru- ment made at a time when the testator , perhaps , could not secure the assistance of persons skilled in the law, courts have always held that it should not be construed strictly like a deed , but that the intention of the testator , though not expressed in proper , clear , legal , and formal words , should , notwithstanding , be ascertained and car- ried into effect . In construing a will , therefore , three questions arise ; first, what the testator's intention is as it is to be collected from the words of the will ; second , whether he has used words which in legal construction. can carry such intent into effect ; third , what effect must be given to every word in the will tending to point out the intent of the testator . To this end expressions admitting of two interpretations should receive that force which will best harmonize with other parts of the will ; and this right is recognized in the Statute Laws of Liberia ( Book I , p . 39 , sec . 27 ) , which says : "It shall be the right of the court to expound all written evidence ." From the will we gather the following facts : First , that the testator Robert R. Johnson , intended a vested fee · interest in lot No. 65, in the city of Monrovia , to be employed by said Church after the death of his wife , I. B. Johnson , in case her need did not compel her to sell it during her lifetime . This grant or devise consti- tuted a contingent legacy , liable to the enjoyment of a fee title , should the contingency (her need ) happen . Second , that there is no evidence that such a contingency happened during the lifetime of the wife , I. B. Johnson . 354 This court further says , nothing in the will in question supports the idea that it was the intention of the testator R. R. Johnson that said property should be devised and passed to others after the death of his wife , I. B. Johnson . Therefore the Providence Baptist Church is entitled to a vested fee interest in lot No. 65, in the city of Monrovia . This court adjudges that the judgment and rulings of the court below are in accordance with the law and evi- dence in the case, and therefore affirms said judgment ; appellant to pay all lawful costs . The clerk of this court is hereby ordered to issue a mandate to the court below , informing it of this judgment . E. A. L. MCAULEY , Appellant , vs. THE REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA, Appellee . [January Term , A. D. 1900. ] Appeal from the Court of Quarter Sessions and Common Pleas , Sinoe County . Injunction . 1. In an action of injunction brought to restrain a Commissioner of Education from teaching public school , it was held that the judgment could not extend beyond perpetuation of the interlocutory injunction and costs , where there appeared reasons for restraining the defendant . 2. Commissioners of Education are the agents of the Government in matters relating to public schools and are therefore incompetent to employ themselves as public school teachers . This case is before this court for review , upon an appeal from the judgment of the Court of Quarter Ses- • sions and Common Pleas , Sinoe County , rendered at the November term of said court , A. D. 1899. The nature of this case as exhibited by the record may be briefly stated as follows , to wit : Upon an application made to the judge of the court below , by the County Attorney of Sinoe County , repre- senting the appellee (the plaintiff in the court below ) , a writ of injunction was issued against the appellant (the defendant in the court below ) to restrain him as 355 School Commissioner , and in his capacity as such , from doing certain acts, which acts , it was complained , he ought not to do . The court below , after hearing the cause, perpetuated the interlocutory injunction , and went further in its ruling and decreed that "the appellant should refund to the Government all moneys obtained by him from the Government as school teacher ." To this ruling and judgment the appellant expected , and has raised in his bill of exceptions three points for the consideration of this court , which we proceed to consider . The first exception laid in the bill of exceptions is , that "the appellant excepts to your Honor's ruling upon the second count in appellee's complaint , in which your Honor in rendering final judgment said that E. A. L. McAuley , School Commissioner for the County of Sinoe , defendant (now appellant ) , desist forever from teaching school and charging upon Government funds , while under commission as School Commissioner of Sinoe County ," etc. The question which is here involved is whether the appellant , while holding the office of School Commis- sioner for Sinoe County , could lawfully and consistently employ himself as a public school teacher or not . In construing statutory laws , courts should exercise the greatest care to ascertain the intention of the law- makers . The apparent object of the Legislature is to be sought for, and made to harmonize with what is dis- closed in the act itself . It would be adhering to a view not consonant with the spirit and intention of the act creating School Commissioners , to hold that such officers , who by the act creating them are constituted and made the supervisors and overseers of our public schools , can at their pleasure appoint themselves as teachers . More- over, it is the opinion of this court that such a view of the law would work an injury to the educational inter- ests and prosperity of the country . 356 The object of the Legislature in providing for School Commissioners ( or Commissioners of Education ) was to promote a sound and healthy system of public schools in our country . They are the agents of the State , so far as relates to the appointment and discharge of teachers , and the general supervision of public schools . We proceed to recite a section of the act bearing on this point : "There shall be appointed after the usual way of offi- cial appointments by the President , a learned and dis- creet person in each county to be styled Commissioner of Education , who shall have the general supervision of all public schools in said county , unto whom quarterly reports shall be made by all teachers of public schools . Said Commissioners shall visit public schools of the respective counties in person four times during each year ; direct and examine all teachers . Said Commis- sioners of Education shall see that all teachers perform faithfully their duty as such , shall institute rules for the government of all public schools , and on failure of any teacher or teachers to discharge his or their duty , or for other sufficient cause , the said Commissioners shall discharge such teacher or teachers , subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior , and appoint others ." (Act . Leg. Lib . appr . Jan. 23 , 1869 , pp . 33-34, sec. 1-2 .) It is clear to the mind of this court , that E. A. L. McAuley , the appellant in this case , while holding the office of School Commissioner for the County of Sinoe and exercising the functions of said office , had no power nor right to appoint himself as a public school teacher for Sinoe County ; because , as we have already ob- served , his relation to the State in the matter of public schools , was that of an agent . The law implies a con- tract between every teacher of a public school and the State ; and the appellant , who was the express represen- tative of the State in such matters , could not contract 357 with himself . To every contract there must be at least two parties . No person can contract with himself in a different capacity , as there must be an agreement of minds . ( 1 Bouv . Law Dict . p . 275 , fig . 2 : "Parties to Contracts .") Therefore it is the opinion of this court that the court below did not err in perpetuating the interlocutory injunction ; and had the judgment of the court below stopped here, this court would have felt itself bound to uphold it. The second exception in the bill of exceptions is as follows , to wit : "The appellant further excepts to your Honor's final judgment in which your Honor said. that appellant should refund to the Government all moneys obtained by him from the Government as school teacher ," etc. This court has failed to discover the law upon which this portion of the judgment is founded . By reference to the record we find that the suit was brought to restrain the appellant from doing certain acts, and the form of action chosen by appellee (the plaintiff in the court below ) was injunction . Undoubtedly the appellee could not recover moneys alleged to have been wrong- fully and unlawfully received by appellant from appellee , under this form of action , for the issues involved in this question are clearly beyond the power of the court to de- cide in the case before it. An action of injunction is defined by our statutes to be an action in which the plaintiff seeks to compel the defendant to permit matters to remain in the present state. (Stat. Lib. ch. 1 , p . 31 , sec . 8. ) And this definition is upheld by Mr. Kerr , a leading authority on the law of injunctions , as well as by Bouvier , Blackstone , and other law-writers . If upon the hearing of an action of injunction it shall appear to the court that the defendant ought not to do the act from the doing of which he is sought to be re- strained , the court shall simply proceed to perpetuate the interlocutory injunction and award costs for the 358 plaintiff . The court below therefore erred in ruling the appellant to refund to appellee moneys received for teaching school , which , this court is of the opinion , could not be recovered in an action of injunction . This court therefore reverses this portion of the judgment and will proceed to give the decree which in its opinion the court below ought to have given in the premises . This court adjudges and decrees that the interlocutory injunction sued out by appellee ( plaintiff in the court below ) against E. A. L. McAuley , appellant ( defendant in the court below ) , to restrain him from teaching public school in the County of Sinoe while holding the office of School Commissioner for said county , is hereby per- petuated , and he , the said appellant , is hereby enjoined and prohibited from teaching public school in the County of Sinoe while holding the office of School Commissioner for said county . And the clerk of this court is hereby authorized to issue a mandate directed to the judge of the court below , informing him of this decision .
Selected judicial document
Moore et als. v. Solomon
Supreme Court of Liberia