1 LLR 263
Source-verified historic case report · Volume I
The printed reporter identifies this case at 1 LLR 263. Source pages 263–278 (PDF pages 273–288). Term: [January Term , A. D. 1894.].
This transcription comes from the preserved PDF text layer. Its source caption and page boundaries were checked against the printed reporter, but the transcription has not been independently proofread against every scanned page. Refer to the scanned original for quotations.
263 ARTHUR BARCLAY , Appellant , vs. WILLIAM H. FREEMAN , Appellee . [January Term , A. D. 1894.] Appeal from the Court of Quarter Sessions and Common Pleas , Montserrado County . Ejectment . 1. A will devising an estate to "A" for her natural life , and after her death to her heirs for their natural life, and , in the event "A" shall die without heirs , to "B" and her heirs forever , creates a life - estate to "A" and her heirs and an estate in fee to "B" and her heirs upon the happen- ing of the contingency mentioned ; and although "B" dies before "A," but leaves a lawful heir , and subsequently "A" dies without issue , the fee therein will vest in the issue of "B" who survives "A." 2. Possession does not always mean ownership ; it may sometimes refer to the right and enjoyment of a term . A party may be possessed of an estate and yet not be seized under the statutes . This action was brought by the appellee , who was the plaintiff below , to recover possession of a half lot , number one hundred and five , in the city of Monrovia . From the record of this case a trial was had at the September term of the Court of Quarter Sessions , Mont- serrado County , 1893. At said trial the plaintiff below obtained a verdict and judgment , from which the appel- lant excepted and brings the same before this court upon a bill of exceptions . In this case the defendant below claims ownership to lot number 105 , in the city of Monrovia , by virtue of a deed in fee simple from J. W. Good , Sheriff of Mont- serrado County , who sold said lot upon an execution founded upon a judgment in debt , against Cornelius and Martha A. H. McKrae , known also as Martha Anderson , at which sale he, the appellant , bought said premises ; while the appellee sets up claim to the half of lot num- ber 105 , founded upon the will and testament of the late Hull and Cheny Anderson , as the only surviving heirs of the body of Elizabeth Anderson , mentioned in said will . On inspecting the will we find that both Martha Ann Hull Anderson and Elizabeth Anderson 264 (known as Elizabeth Freeman ) were the grand -daughters of the testators , and that to them the testators devised certain estates . (See the will . ) In the first paragraph of the will is created the interest of Martha Ann Hull Anderson (or McKrae ) in the following language : "We will and bequeath unto the oldest daughter of my son Henry Anderson , namely, Martha Hull Anderson , my dwelling house and all the appurtenances thereto , for her natural life , and after her death it shall , should she have heirs , go to them, for their natural life , and should she die without any, then to her sister , Elizabeth Anderson , the daughter of Henry Anderson , and her heirs forever , so as to be understood that the above- named property shall remain in the family from heir to heir and not be sold ." The language here used , in the opinion of the court , admits of no other interpreta- tion than that it was the intention of the testators to secure to Martha Hull Anderson and her heirs during life , an estate for life in the premises mentioned in the will , and no more ; and that in case she died without heirs , (here the testators unmistakably meant heirs of her body , ) that the fee title to said premises shall be vested in Elizabeth Anderson and her heirs (meaning also the heirs of her body ) . Nothing is more in harmony with the Statutes of Liberia than that the rights of parents descend to their children . ( See Lib . Stat . 1st Book , page 137 , sec . 5. ) Every reflecting mind may at once agree , that with such plain language as was used in the will of the testators in relation to Martha Hull Anderson , she was only to enjoy a life estate , and that the same terminated after her death . Notwithstanding , her sister Elizabeth died be- fore her. On the happening of such events it is the duty of this court to find out as nearly as possible what was the intention of the testators upon such contingent circumstances . Elizabeth Anderson dies first , but leaves an heir of her body , namely , W. H. Freeman , the appel- 265 lee. Martha Hull Anderson dies , leaving no heir of her body . Nothing can assist the court in finding this out better than the following non -ambiguous language , used by the testators , viz ., "so as to be understood that the above -named property shall remain in the family from heir to heir , and not be sold ." This part of the will , in the opinion of this court , interprets itself , and conclusively shows that Martha Hull Anderson held but a life estate in half of lot number 105 , and could not convey the same ; and that the fee simple title to said lot vests in the heir of Elizabeth Anderson , the appellee in this case . It is hardly neces- sary for this court to say that the practice of allowing the owner of property to direct its destination after his death is of very ancient date and coeval with civiliza- tion itself , so far as we know , and courts of law in all ages have respected that right . On inspecting the answer we find the following words : "That Martha McKrae during her lifetime was possessed of lot number one hundred and five, in the city of Monrovia ." Now the word "possessed ," says the learned Judge Bouvier , means the right and enjoyment of a term , or a person having a term who is said to be possessed and not seized under the statutes . This word embraces the idea "to occupy , to hold with or without ownership ;" hence it is uncertain as to which meaning the appellant intended in the use of the term . However , it is due to the appellant con- ducting the defence in this case , for us to say he has dis- played great ability in the effort to show that a will creating a perpetuity is unlawful , and had that point been raised in the answer this court would be bound to consider it . But the answer raised no such question ; hence , in keeping with the former rulings of this court , the omission to make this point a ground of defence in the answer must by this court be held as a waiver . The court further says, on inspecting the record , that it does not appear in the testimony that the objections were sustained by testimony amounting to proof . 266 To conclude , the court says , after a most careful review of the case , that it does not see why the judgment of the court below should be reversed . Therefore the court adjudges that the judgment of the court below is affirmed. and that the clerk of this court make known to the court below the doings of this court . KRISTIAN HERMAN JOGENSEN , Appellant , vs. URIAS KNOWLAND , Appellee . [January Term , A. D. 1895. ] Appeal from the Court of Quarter Sessions and Common Pleas Sinoe County . Damages . 1. A verdict which upon its face appears to be the unanimous con- clusion of a petit jury upon facts submitted , is valid even though defec- tive in form . Verdicts cannot be set aside for error in form ; by the rules of practice such defects are allowed to be corrected. 2. The want of proof will defeat the best laid action ; the statement of facts in a declaration , however clearly and logically they may be set forth , cannot be taken as proof of their truthfulness . 3. In actions for damages the jury should take into consideration the misconduct of the defendant when shown , in mitigation of damages . This is an appeal from the proceedings and decision of the Court of Quarter Sessions , Sinoe County , at its February term , A. D. 1894. The action was brought by the appellee , plaintiff below , for damages on account of an alleged assault and battery. At the trial the appellee obtained judgment , the same being based upon the verdict of the jury, unto whom the facts were submitted by the court ; from which judgment , and other proceed- ings of said court , exceptions were taken by the appel- lant and upon the exceptions thus taken the case is before this court for review . The first exception taken is to the verdict of the jury , because it was without date , which objection the lower court did not sustain , and ordered said verdict recorded . 267 This court says a verdict is the unanimous agreement of a petty jury as to facts submitted to them for deter- mination , and the dating or non - dating of it is a matter of form ; and that a verdict should not be set aside for want of form , as such defects are met by the rules and practice of courts , allowing such to be amended . Hence this exception is not well taken . Second, because the verdict rendered is contrary to the evidence , as the evidence failed to prove the allega- tions set forth in the complaint , but rather sustains the plea of justification set up in the answer of the appellant . This court is of opinion that this objection and exception is well taken , because "every party alleging the existence of a fact is required to prove the same , and also that the want of proof must defeat the best laid action , because facts , however logically set forth in a complaint , can never in law be accepted as proof , but must be sup- ported by evidence to warrant either a court or jury to consider such statement true, upon the principle that "every man is presumed to be innocent until he is proven guilty ." This action is founded in damages for an assault and battery unprovoked , and without any legal cause . The appellant pleads justification in whatever may have been his acts . Hence the plain duty of the court is to ascertain , from the record and testimony rendered in the court below , whether or not the verdict and judg- ment are supported by the law and the evidence rendered in the case . Having divested this case of all extraneous matter , we find the evidence as follows : D. W. Frazier , witness , stated as follows : "I did not see the affair between the plaintiff and defendant . I was at the defendant's place of business , the Norwegian's store . The defendant asked the chief manager to assist him to clear the store , as a row was coming . I heard Knowland say the defendant had kicked him ; this the 268 defendant denied , and charged the plaintiff with being in his way . I saw no signs of injury done ." H. W. Brooks , Jr. , says : "I saw the plaintiff below , and Daniel Beal , at the time mentioned in the complaint , sitting on the steps leading into the store of the Nor- wegian . I saw when the appellant came to the door , stood between them, and shoved them off ; before this he told them twice to move . Knowland asked , Why did he shove him from the steps ? He , the defendant , answered , You are in my way ." Samuel Ferguson states that at the time laid in the complaint , he was present , and that the plaintiff and Beal were sitting on the steps leading to the store of defendant . The defendant asked them , "What are you hanging round my store for?" Plaintiff looked up at him and went on talking . Defendant came up to the steps again and asked the same question ; receiving no reply , he stood between them and said , "Excuse me ." They did not move . Then with his feet he sidewise shoved them both off the steps . He thought the defen- dant was protecting his premises . Daniel Beal says he and the plaintiff were much in liquor , sitting on the steps and talking very loud about the war at Palmas ; that they annoyed traders in the store . The defendant below came to the door and asked , "What are you doing here ?" They gave no answer . He came again and eased them off the steps . Had they not been in liquor it would not have happened . As to damages and injury , he does not know that plain- tiff was injured ; he was not . C. B. Scotland knew nothing about the plaintiff being injured or damaged by the defendant . This closes the testimony bearing on the case . From the evidence it is clear to the mind of the court that while it shows that the defendant did shove plain- tiff with his feet from off the steps of the defendant's store , or place where he was employed , yet we are of 269 the opinion that the court below , and the jury , should have taken into consideration the rule of mitigation of damages , because of the misconduct or provocation proved by the testimony , as well as the right of men to protect their premises . Carefully looking into all the circumstances surround- ing this case, we are forced to the following conclusions : First , that the verdict rendered in this case is against the law and the evidence ; second , that the judgment ren- dered based upon said verdict is unlawful , not being founded upon a lawful verdict . Therefore , to sustain such proceedings would work great damage , and would place mercantile houses at the mercy of intruders . Therefore this court adjudges that the judgment ren- dered in this case is hereby reversed , and that the appel- lant recover from the appellee his legal costs in this action ; and further , that the clerk of this court issue a lawful mandate to the court in which the action was tried , to the effect of this judgment . CHARLES H. DUNBAR , Appellant , vs. REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA , Appellee . [January Term , A. D. 1895.] Appeal from the Court of Quarter Sessions and Common Pleas , Sinoe County . False Imprisonment . This case was tried in the Court of Quarter Sessions , Sinoe County , at its May term , 1894 , and is brought before this court upon a bill of exceptions , for review . The exceptions taken below are as follows : First , "Be- cause the court overruled a motion offered by the defen- dant below , praying an abatement of the indictment and process because of its uncertainty in setting forth the Christian name of the defendant and not describing him with certainty ." Second, "Because the indictment 270 contained abbreviations , whereas abbreviations are not allowed in indictments ." Third , "Because the indict- ment failed to show that the imprisonment alleged was against the will of the party said to have been imprisoned ." The court takes occasion to say that the principle upon which cases are determined by the highest judicial tribunals of the world , under pleas of abatement for uncertainty in describing and identifying defendants , is so well known to the common law practice that we deem it unnecessary to enter upon it. In this case the defendant below was indicted and arraigned for false imprisonment , in due form ; during the trial he motioned the court to abate the indictment , because it was vague and uncertain in that he was called in the indictment C. H. Dunbar , and if he , the defendant, was meant in the indictment , his name is Charles H. Dunbar . This court is of the opinion that all indictments should set forth with clearness the Christian and surname of the defendant, so that he may be described and identi- fied beyond doubt , and if his name is not known to the jury in the indictment , so as to describe and identify him , the indictment should state that his name is not known . This plea , upon which all others contained in the motion depended , was in the opinion of this court well founded and should have been sustained by the court below . Therefore , the court below erred in over- ruling this plea . Again , the court below in passing upon this motion also ruled that the defendant in answering at the arraignment waived all legal objections thereto . We are of the opinion that this ruling is erroneous , because the defendant was bound to appear, by law and practice , to answer and then put in his plea or objections , and his failing to do so , however wrong the name by which he was called , on motion made to the court, judgment by default could be demanded and obtained against him. The consideration of these points 271 shows clearly that the trial below was not conducted according to law . Therefore the court adjudges that the judgment rendered by the court below be and the same is hereby reversed . C. B. REEVES , Appellant , vs. MARK HYDER , Appellee . [January Term , A. D. 1895.] Appeal from the Court of Quarter Sessions and Common Pleas , Grand Bassa County . Ejectment . 1. Ejectment supports the idea of adverse possession in the defend- ant . The questions involved in such trials are of a mixed nature , which under the statutes must be tried by a jury under the direction of the court. It is not error for the court to refuse to instruct the jury on any point in such trials , when in its opinion it does not appear proper so to do. 2. In ejectment the plaintiff must show in himself a legal title to the property in dispute to recover it ; by title here is meant the right of possession arising either from descent or purchase , and the right of entry. 3. Under the statute the probation of a deed makes it legal evidence ; where there are objections to same they should be made at the time the instrument is offered for probation , where the party has knowledge of the transaction . In trials of suits of ejectment it is not error in the court to instruct the jury that a party has offered no legal evidence in the shape of deed to the property in dispute ; it is also not error for the court to instruct the jury that the plaintiff must recover upon the strength of his own title and not upon the weakness of the defendant's . (Oliver vs. Bigham , 1870, Harris vs. Locket , 1875. ) This appeal was taken from the proceedings , rulings , and final judgment of the Court of Common Pleas and Quarter Sessions , Grand Bassa County , at its June term for the year 1894 , and is brought before this court upon a bill of exceptions , for review . Before passing upon the material points presented for this court's consideration , it is due to the learned counsels conducting both the prosecution and the defence in this case , for us to acknowledge the great skill and legal ability displayed by them in urging the cause of their respective clients . This case is without a parallel in the 272 history of our courts, and presents features the most complicated ; but as in every question of human action. there is involved a principle of both right and wrong , we have spared no pains to search out the legal rights surrounding this case , which has enabled us to come to such conclusions as are drawn from sound principles of the law . Nothing tends greater to disturb tranquility , to hinder industry and improvement in communities , than the insecurity of property , personal or real , to prevent which courts of justice are established . This is an action of ejectment , the method employed by a plaintiff to recover the possession of his lands wrongfully withheld from him by a defendant . Ejectment is therefore a possessory action and supports the idea of adverse possession , hence a trial of the legal titles of the contending parties . It being a mixed question of both law and fact, the statute provides that such trial is to be by a jury , with the assistance and under the direction of the court . (Lib. Stat . Book 1 , page 47, sec . 3. ) It is therefore among the peculiar trials wherein the court may not only assist, but may direct the jury in coming to the conclusion warranted by law and facts in the case . Hence it is not error in the court to refuse to admit or instruct the jury on any matter which , in its opinion , does not tend to establish the truth and justice of the case . For this reason the jury and the court have a right , in ejectment , to weigh probabilities and solve doubts as to matters of fact ; and if in their minds the preponderance of proof , or rational influence as to any fact on which the title depends , is on the side of the plaintiff or defendant , they ought to find accordingly . To recover in ejectment the plaintiff must prove in himself a legal title . To this point , however , the court says the term "title " as is here meant , may be briefly stated to be the means whereby the owner of the lands has the just possession of his property ; and we further 273 remark that title to real estate is acquired by two methods , namely, by descent , and by purchase . Pur- chase in a limited sense is applied only to such acquisi- tions of lands as are obtained by way of bargain and sale , for money or some other valuable consideration . Therefore in ejectment the plaintiff has a right to show a vested legal title , no matter how, if fairly acquired , or through whom it may have been delivered , and if no adverse right or possession be shown , such plaintiff may recover without showing possession or the right of posses- sion , or any entry or the right of entry. This and similar situations authorize the exceptions to the general rule and doctrine frequently announced by this court and which the court reaffirms . In ejectment the plaintiff recovers upon the strength of his own title and not on the weakness of that of his adversary. This support , however weak , that a defen- dant sets up title either legal or equitable, in the absence of both, in contemplation of law , debars the trespasser . None , therefore , can fail to see that the application of the above doctrine , without the exception pointed out , would defeat the very intention of the action of eject- ment , whose primary use is to try the titles of the liti- gant parties in dispute. In reviewing the transcript of the record showing the proceedings of the court in the trial below , we find that the estate of one John Parker , deceased , intestate , was by the Probate Court of Grand Bassa County , ordered to be sold by the administrator of the said estate , acting under authority granted by that court , and that a sale took place by public auction and that at the said auction Mark Hyder , the said plaintiff below , bought that part of said estate as is known to be lot number 17 , in the township of Hartford in the County of Grand Bassa . The record further shows that he , the said plaintiff below , paid the purchase money for said land , but did not obtain a deed for the same from said. 274 administrator , and that the said administrator died ( if previously to closing the said estate as required by law , the record fails to show) ; that during the year 1893 , the said Mark Hyder made petition before the Monthly and Probate Court of Grand Bassa , S. S. Herring , judge pre- siding , to appoint administrators of the estate of the said John Parker, which was granted . P. M. Scott and John Watson were appointed , who completed the title of the plaintiff below to lot number 17, in Hartford , as aforementioned , by granting him a deed ; that said deed was probated and registered according to law. This court is of the opinion that the time a deed is offered for probation is the proper time to set up legal or equitable objections to it, by any party who may be affected by its probation ; since by statute the probation makes it legal evidence before courts of law , all such objections being referable to the Court of Quarter Ses- sions for determination . The evidence in this case fails to show that any objections were offered at the time of the probation of this deed by the defendant below , or any one representing him ; hence its probation was not opposed . It It is proper for us to notice next , the evidence fur- nished in the record of the Monthly and Probate Court of Grand Bassa County in the trial of this case . appears that one Dr. Smith , being present at the time of the probation of this deed of the said Mark Hyder , stated to the court , as his objection , that he through mistake sold this tract of land number 17 , to the defen- dant below . This was , as is obvious to all , not an objection to the deed , unless it applied to the one he gave to the defendant below through mistake . The jurisdiction of the Probate Court to appoint the acting administrators under surrounding circumstances , not having been put in issue , is not before this court , as it was not before the court below . The third exception taken is because during the trial the plaintiff below offered as evidence a copy of the record 275 of the Monthly and Probate Court containing matters and statements made in his absence . Had this point of exception contained an averment or statement that the plaintiff below omitted or refused to cite or give notice to the appellant to be present at the time when such. statements were recorded in the court referred to , it would have been error in the court below to have ad- mitted such evidence ; but no such facts being found in the record , this court is of opinion that irregularities do not appear such as to amount to an error . The fourth exception presented to this court for its consideration is , because the court below instructed the jury to the effect that the appellant in this case had no evidence in the shape of a deed of title . This court , after careful examination of the entire record and pro- ceedings in this case , fails to see wherein the appellant offered either oral or written testimony to prove the right of possession or the right of entry , or any lawful or equitable title to lot number 17, in the township of Hartford in the County of Grand Bassa . Hence , con- sidering that the trial was by a jury with the assistance and direction of the court, it was not error for the court to instruct the jury that the appellant had offered or had no evidence in the shape of title for the land in dis- pute . As to the point that the court instructed the jury to the effect that they should not notice the weakness of the appellant's title , but the strength of the appellee's , we remark that this is not error , but is in support of the repeated rulings of this court . See decision in cases of Oliver vs. Bigham , and Harris vs. Locket , namely , that the plaintiff in ejectment must recover upon the strength of his own legal title and not on the weakness of that of his adversary. The fifth exception embodies the other exceptions taken at the trial below , which is , because the court refused to grant a new trial when prayed for after ver- dict . As to this point the court says , the granting or 276 refusal of a new trial is a matter in the sound discretion of the court , according to the exigency of each particular case, upon principles of sound justice and equity, and this discretion is not generally reviewable on error , when the court is satisfied that the verdict is not contrary to the law, the evidence and its legal instructions . Other- wise it should grant a new trial . Considering this case from every reasonable stand- point , this court fails to see sufficient cause to disturb the judgment of the court below , and therefore adjudges that the judgment of the court below ought to be and the same is hereby affirmed , and that appellant pay all costs in this action . Z. T. GREEN , SAMUEL GRAY , and his wife ANNA S. GRAY , Appellants , vs. B. J. TURNER , Appellee . [January Term , A. D. 1895. ] Appeal from the Court of Quarter Sessions and Common Pleas , Sinoe County . Injunction . 1. An answer filed within ten days after notice of the filing of the complaint is within the statute ; it is the time the notice was served, and not when the complaint was filed, that governs the answer in this respect . 2. In injunctions the court cannot decide issue involving the validity of title , such being a mixed question which by statute is triable by a jury under the directions of the court . This is an appeal case in an action of injunction brought up to this court from the Court of Quarter Sessions , Sinoe County , sitting in equity, by appellants (defendants below ) upon a bill of exceptions . Before coming to a judgment in this case , the court will proceed to notice the points in the bill of exceptions to which its attention has been carefully given , and will dispose of them as they stand in their order . The first point to be considered and disposed of is set forth thus : "Your Honor's ruling out defendants ' sufficient answer , 277 which was in keeping with the statute laws of the Repub- lic of Liberia in injunction , because the sheriff did not serve the notice on the plaintiff until one day after the expiration of the ten days which the statute law of Liberia allows for the filing of answers ." After carefully reviewing the record in the case the court finds that the answer was filed within the time allowed by statute ; and it is not prescribed by statute that the "answer" must be filed within ten days after the filing of the "complaint ," but within ten days after notice has been given of the filing of the complaint . (Lib . Stat . Bk . 1 , Chap . 5 , sec. 5. ) Therefore , it is the opinion of this court that the judge below erred in ruling out defendants ' (now appellants ' ) answer . The second exception under consideration is , the objec- tion of appellants to the first part of the decree of the judge below , in which the judge said that because the parties claimed titles to the land in question by deeds. produced in evidence , which were given by the Republic of Liberia , he would not consider the validity of titles, or the matter of quiet enjoyment, which is collateral . On this point it is the opinion of this court that the judge below did not err in refusing to consider and decide the titles, for such a decree would be deciding a mixed question of law and fact, which cannot be tried and de- termined in equity ; for the statutes declare that "all questions of law and fact must be tried by jury, assisted by the court ." The third point is appellants ' exception to the last part of the decree of the judge below , in that he said that "the court has carefully and thoroughly digested the laws bearing on this action , and it appearing to the court that there are sufficient grounds , therefore the court adjudges that the defendants be forever enjoined and prohibited from intermeddling or annoying and harrassing the said plaintiff in the cultivation of his twenty acres farm land , situated on Po River , and being 278 number thirty -three , formerly styled number thirty - six , unless otherwise determined by law, and that the plaintiff recover from the defendants all legal costs in this action ." The opinion of the court on this point is that the judge below erred ; for in the first part of the decree the judge said that he could not consider the question of validity of titles, or the matter of quiet enjoyment, which is collateral , both parties claiming said land under deeds from the Republic of Liberia . This court is at a loss to know by what parity of legal reasoning did the judge decree that the defendants , now appellants , be forever enjoined and prohibited from intermeddling , or annoying and harrassing said plaintiff in the cultivation of his twenty acres of farm land situated on Po River , and bearing number thirty -three, formerly styled number thirty-six . And this court further says that the judge below erred in said decree by enjoining a perpetual injunction on defendants , now appellants , which , in the opinion of this court , is virtually deciding the validity of titles . In this equity case the irregularity of the proceedings of the court below are so much opposed to equity and good conscience as to lead this court to the following determination : This court adjudges that the decree of the court below is hereby reversed and the injunction dissolved, and that appellants recover all costs in this appeal case from appellee . The clerk is hereby com- manded to issue a mandate to the court from whence this case came , informing it of this decree .
Selected judicial document
Barclay v. Freeman
Supreme Court of Liberia