1 LLR 139
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The printed reporter identifies this case at 1 LLR 139. Source pages 139–167 (PDF pages 149–177). Term: [January Term , A. D. 1881.].
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139 THE REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA , Appellant, vs. REGINALD A. SHERMAN , Appellee . [January Term , A. D. 1881.] Appeal from the Court of Admiralty , Montserrado County . Attorneys -Libellants-Departure in pleadings-Bond not essential in suits commenced by writ of attachment brought by the government. 1. To be entitled to the privilege of obtaining a license as an attorney the party must be a lawyer , and the court granting said license has power , either by standing rules or otherwise, to declare what qualifica- cations shall be requisite to constitute one a lawyer . An attorney, although qualified, is not entitled to practise before any court before obtaining the license to do so required by statute . Where the term of an attorney's license has expired he is barred from practising until same is renewed . 2. The party really entitled to the relief is the libellant in admiralty . A suit brought by the Collector of Customs on behalf of the Republic of Liberia , under the Act of 1878 does not constitute him the party en- titled to relief ; and therefore , if in a subsequent pleading the name of the Collector of Customs is omitted , this will not amount to a departure nor will it vitiate the pleading. A departure in pleading is where a party departs from the case or defence which he has first made , and has recourse to another. 3. The Statute of 1880, requiring bond to be given where the plain- tiff begins his suit by a writ of attachment , does not apply to suits brought by the government . Suits against the Republic of Liberia according to the Constitution can only be brought in such cases as the Legislature of the Republic may by law direct . The Legislature has made no provision for suits to be brought against the Republic for the violation of the conditions of a bond ; such suits cannot therefore be maintained at law . This case comes up on appeal from the Court of Admi- ralty, Montserrado County , having been instituted by the libellant , now appellant , for the recovery of an amount said to be due by the defendant, now appellee , for import and export duties . On the hearing of the case , after arguments on some of the points raised in the pleadings , the judge of said court ruled that "this action has not been brought in the manner prescribed by law, in that no bond has been given by the libellant, as the law demands in this case ; therefore this case is hereby dismissed and the libellant ruled to costs in this suit." 140 The exceptions taken by the libellant to the rulings of the court are these :- First , to that prohibiting A. F. Belgrave , Esq . , attorney and counsellor at law , from taking part in the case before complying with the law governing attorney's license . The law pertaining to attorneys , as found in Lib . Stat . 1856 , p . 115 , sec . 1 , and the amendatory act , Lib . Stat . 1866 , p . 61 , are thus to be construed : That no person shall be allowed to plead , implead or prosecute as an attorney before any courts of this Republic but such as shall be regularly licensed by the courts ; and such license may at any time be withdrawn , where any indecorous language is used by the person towards either the court or jury . That for the enjoyment of the privi- lege of an attorney there shall be paid annually twelve dollars and fifty cents into the public treasury , fifty cents to the clerk of the court for drawing said license , and such license shall be signed by the judge of the court and recorded by the register. That all attorneys having paid such amounts , and being regularly licensed , shall not by any rule of court be prohibited from pleading in any court of the Republic . There are several points which present themselves to us in considering this law- First , that to be entitled to the privilege of obtaining a license the party must be an attorney , and this, impliedly at least , gives the court the right to determine , by rule or otherwise , who shall be regarded as attorneys ; for it is not to be presumed that the law supposed all persons were attorneys , but , in requiring that attorneys shall be licensed by the court to enjoy the privilege , must have intended that the courts should judge as to who were to be considered as belong- ing to that class . Secondly , that a party having been acknowledged or received as an attorney is still debarred from the enjoyment of the privilege , cannot be allowed to plead, implead or prosecute as such , until regularly licensed, by the payment of the annual tax into the 141 treasury , the drawing of the clerk , signing by the judge , and recording by the register, of the license . This being done, he cannot be prohibited from pleading unless for the offences named in his license ; and this feature of the law suggests that the license is essential , otherwise he would suffer no disadvantage by its withdrawal , for if he could practise without it in one instance , surely he would have as much right to the privilege after it was withdrawn as before it was obtained. The judge of the Admiralty Court did not err in pro- hibiting the attorney from exercising or enjoying the privileges of such, before he was regularly licensed . The next exception is to the ruling of the judge that the libellant's reply be stricken out of the record of the case . Upon reviewing the record it is found that the points raised in the rejoinder , upon which the libellant's reply was stricken out, are , 1 , Because it " is not the reply of the party libellant in this case , nor does it claim to be the reply of such party libellant ; 2 , That by changing the name or omitting the name of the party libellant , a departure is made in said reply from the ground taken by the libellant in the libel filed in this suit." The query arises , Who is the libellant ? "The party really entitled to the relief should always be made libel- lant ." (Benedict's Admiralty , sec . 380. ) Examining the libel , it appears to be a proceeding by and for the belief and benefit of the Republic of Liberia , which is clearly set forth as the libellant , and recognized as such in all of the subsequent pleadings . And it is proper that in all suits in which the Republic is the real plaintiff , that the proceedings should be in the name of the Republic , unless it is otherwise ordered by act of the Legislature . The Legislature has not , however , done so with respect to suits arising under the revenue act ; for in the same article of the act making it the duty of the Collector of Customs to enforce the collection of 142 duties , it is distinctly declared that "all penalties and forfeitures which may be incurred for offences against this act shall be sued for and recovered with costs of suit in the name of the Republic of Liberia . " ( 1 Lib . Stat . 1856 , p . 93 , secs . 2 and 8. ) Amendments made at sub- sequent times may have altered the method of procedure , etc.; but there has been no repeal of the provision re- quiring the suit to be in the name of the Republic . True it is that in the libel the Republic complains "by and through William N. Williams , acting for and on behalf of Charles Anthony Snetter , Collector of Customs of the Port of Monrovia ," and in the reply this is omitted ; but in both of these pleadings the Republic is declared to be the libellant , and the ommission in the latter plead- ing to say by and through whom the case is brought is not of so material a character as to amount to a depar- ture . A departure is defined to be "the statement of matter in a replication , rejoinder or subsequent plead- ing , as a cause of action or defence , which is not pursu- ant to the previous pleading of the same party , and which does not support and fortify it." ( 1 Bouv . Law Dict . p . 460 "Departure .") "A departure in pleading takes place when a party quits or departs from the case or defence which he has first made , and has recourse to another." ( 1 Chitty , p . 674 ; 2 Bouv . Ins. sec . 2992 ; I Tidd's Practice , p . 688. ) "In all cases where the variance between the former and the latter pleading is on a point not material , there is no departure ." ( Stephen's Pleadings , p . 417.) "It is not a departure if a party vary in the replication from his count in an immaterial matter." (10 U. S. Digest , first series , p . 182 , sec. 1481. ) The judge of the Court of Admiralty therefore erred in ruling that the libellant's reply should be stricken from the records. The third exception is to the ruling of the court on the first and second pleas in defendant's answer , that the 143 action was not brought in the manner prescribed by law and no bond had been given by libellant . The laws specially relied on by the judge in support of this ruling are the Statutes of Liberia approved Feb. 8 , 1878 ( p . 4, sec . 3 ) , providing that on failure of any per- son to pay his dues "it shall be the duty of the Col- lector of Customs to apply to the judge of the Court of Quarter Sessions and Common Pleas and obtain a writ of attachment according to the laws regulating attach- ments ," etc. , and statute approved Jan. 15 , 1880 ( p . 9 ) , providing or prescribing the manner of beginning suits by attachment . We will not discuss the propriety , impropriety or policy of a government being required to give bond . We think that it has been generally admitted in the arguments by counsel on either side that a bond could be required of the government only on special act of the Legislature , for , suppose the government gave bond and forfeited it, how would the forfeiture be enforced in the absence of legislative enactment , when the Constitu- tion declares that "suits may be brought against the Republic in such manner and in such cases as the Legis- lature may by law direct "? ( Lib . Stat . p . 234 ; Consti- tution , Art . 1 , sec . 17. ) Now under the first statute it was not necessary for any bond to be given . But then it is contended that the Republic was required to do so by the subsequent statute of the Legislature . If this act affected the government in matters of attachment in common with other plaintiffs , we cannot regard it as doing so simply as to giving bond and not in its other features , and con- sequently if the Republic is , under this act , placed on the same platform with individual plaintiffs , it is to be presumed or inferred that its privileges under it are the same as those of other plaintiffs . "All plaintiffs ," says the third section of that statute , "who shall commence their actions by writs of attachment shall be required. 144 to first give good and sufficient bond and security" ; but the act does not force any of these "all plaintiffs " to commence their actions by writs of attachment , for observe in section 1 it is stated that the plaintiff may commence his action by this mode of procedure ; and of course if he elects some other mode , he is not forced to a compliance with the requirements set forth for obtain- ing writs of attachment . Either the Republic was or was not brought under this statute ; if it was , then it was not competent to elect some other mode of commencing the suit than that of attachment ; if it was not and remained under the former , then the writ should have been granted without requir- ing a bond . In the opinion of this court the Republic is not brought under this act , which is "An act to amend an act entitled An act to amend an act establishing the judiciary and fixing the powers common to the several courts." Application was made under the law, Feb. , 1878 , for the writ and monition ; the monition which follows the issuing of the writ was issued , and the writ , if it was not, should have been granted , and the judge failing to do so. should not have dismissed the case for what was his and not libellant's error . The failure to issue the writ worked no wrong to defendant , but to libellant , and it is a legal maxim , "Actus curiæ neminem gravatut" (the act of the court shall prejudice no man) . This court cannot , therefore , affirm the ruling of the court below in this respect . The court recognizes its right to dispose of the case by giving such final judgment or decree as the Court of Admiralty should have given , but as the other points in the case were not gone into and argued in that or this court , we will reserve our opinion on the other questions of law appearing by the pleadings and record of the case . Therefore , the decree of the court below is hereby reversed and annulled . It is further ordered , adjudged 145 and decreed by this court that the judge below be in- structed to proceed forthwith to open said cause for such proofs and evidence as may establish the merits of the case on either side , and to adjudge according to the law and right of the case the said libel , so that its proceedings thereon may be sent back to this court for final adjudi- cation before the close of the present term . REGINALD A. SHERMAN, Appellant , vs. REPUB- LIC OF LIBERIA, Appellee . [January Term , A. D. 1881. ] Appeal from the Court of Admiralty , Montserrado County . Specific performance in the payment of duties-Set-off against Government -Courts of Admiralty —Liberian paper currency- The engraved bills or paper currency of Liberia are in their nature a contract. 1. Where a statute provides that certain revenue of Government must be paid in a certain class or kind of money , the obligation is im- perative and cannot be avoided , even where a demand note for the same class of money is tendered in lieu. 2. In suits where the Government is plaintiff , a set -off will not be allowed unless specially provided for by statute . The engraved notes or paper currency of Liberia is not a proper tender for the one tenth of duties provided for in the Act of 1880. 3. Courts cannot enforce a contract in manner otherwise than that expressed therein. Where a suit for debt is brought against the Gov- ernment, the court cannot exercise jurisdiction or take cognizance of same , nor can it exercise jurisdiction in such circumstances over a cross action under a plea of set -off. Courts of Admiralty do not take notice of set -offs where they do not grow out of a maritime contract . 4. The Act of 1880, requiring one tenth of duties to be paid in gold or silver coin, does not destroy nor impair the obligation expressed on the face of certain demand notes issued by the Government of Liberia . A currency may be lawful and yet not a tender for all dues . 5. The Legislature cannot make a law impairing the obligation of a contract ; it has , however, the power to adopt measures for the benefit of the nation, and, from the necessity of the case , which may be subse- quently varied or discontinued as the public may require. This case is now before us for the second time this term , under the following circumstances : Having come for hearing before the Admiralty Court, Montserrado County, to which it has been remanded by this court , 146 to be opened "for such proofs and evidence as may establish the merits of the case on either side ," and for the libel to be adjudged "according to the law and right of the case," an agreement was entered into by the parties in the cause to this effect : To admit the facts set forth in the libel and in the fourth and fifth pleas in defendant's answer , and to submit the following points or questions of law to be decided by the court after hearing arguments : ( 1 ) Whether the currency mentioned in the fourth plea in the defendant's answer is or is not such a contract as can be made a set-off against the claim set forth in the libel ; ( 2 ) Whether the tender of such currency in payment of the libellant's claim , and its refusal , does or does not bar the libellant's recovery in this action , or , ( 3 ) Whether the law requiring the one tenth of duties to be paid in gold or silver coin does or does not impair the obligation of a contract . According to this agreement the admitted facts by the defendant , now appellant , are his indebtedness to the libellant, now appellee , to the amount of one hundred and sixteen dollars and seventy -six cents, on account of the one tenth of duties on his imports and exports , and his refusal to pay the same in gold or silver coin or good approved bills of exchange , such refusal being in violation of an act entitled "An act to amend an act entitled An act amendatory and supplementary to an act regulating the payment of duties, passed and ap- proved January 5th , 1879." The libellant admits the facts of having issued a paper currency and contracted to redeem the same in gold and silver coin on demand ; that the defendant having taken said currency so issued in exchange for goods imported , and demanded pay- ment therefor , payment was refused by the said libel- lant ; that the defendant did tender and offer to pay to the said libellant the sum of money claimed to be due for said duties in the lawful paper currency aforesaid , which the libellant refused to receive . 147 Upon the trial of the points and questions of law sub- mitted to the court , the defendant took exceptions to the rulings of the judge , and the appellee in the case when first before this court now comes as the appellant , and brings for the consideration of the court the ques- tions as contained in his bill of exceptions . After having very attentively listened to the argu- ments advanced by counsel on each side , and carefully investigated and weighed the law cited in support of their respective positions, this court is now enabled to declare the result of its deliberations and researches on the questions presented to it. As to the rulings of the judge : ( 1 ) That the currency mentioned in the fourth plea of defendant's answer " is not sufficient in law to be a set -off against the claim of the one tenth part of the duties claimed ," see Lib . Stat . 1880 , p. 18, secs . I and 2. (2) That the tender of such currency in payment of the libellant's claim for the one tenth does not bar the libellant's recovery in this action . The collector accepting the tender of anything but gold or silver coin or bills of exchange would subject him to penal servitude or fine ( see Lib . Stat . p . 18, secs . 1-2 ) , and the refusal does not bar the libellant's recovery in this action . We are inclined to follow the principle that, in general , when the Government is plaintiff , no set -off will be allowed , "except in cases where it is permitted by act of the Legislature ." (2 Bouv . Law Dict . p . 516-" Set- off ;" fig. 4. ) And this inclination is confirmed by that section of our Constitution which declares that "suits may be brought against the Republic in manner and in such cases as the Legislature may by law direct ." Under this provision it will be observed that no claim can be proceeded with or established against the Government in any other manner than that prescribed by law, and , to us at least , it seems a fair , logical and legal inference that where a special process has been thus prescribed 148 for enforcing claims against the state, the defendant in an action brought by the Government cannot , because he has claims against the Government , evade the legal course laid down for him to pursue to secure those claims , by setting off such demands . A set-off is in the nature of and is governed by the same principles as a cross action , and to admit it would be virtually allowing suits to be brought against the Government other than in the manner prescribed . Under a plea of set-off and tender, it is questionable whether either a court of law or equity could enforce the payment of a contract in a manner otherwise than that expressed therein , and it seems reasonable to conclude that if the court can exercise no jurisdiction over actions of debt brought against the Republic , it cannot do so over a cross action of debt under a plea of set-off, unless by expressed direction of the Legislature . If the claim is in the nature of a contract, the party aggrieved by non -performance of the contract has had a remedy provided by the law, which also pre- scribes the manner in which he shall seek it. Then there is another consideration . The counsels in their endeavors , during the course of their arguments , to impress the fact that the case is in a Court of Admi- ralty , have not failed . Now "Courts of Admiralty do not take notice of set-offs , except so far as they grow out of a maritime contract submitted to their cognizance , and then principally by way of diminishing compensa- tion and not as an independant right ." ( 12 U. S. Digest , first series , p . 229 , sec . 998. ) The judge therefore did not err in refusing to admit the claim of the defendant as a set-off. Does the tender made to the collector bar the libellant's recovery in this action? We propose to answer this by ref- ence to the authorities on the consequences and effect of a tender. A tender by one party , of paying a debt or per- forming a duty , and a refusal of the other to accept thereof , do in some cases amount to a payment of the debt or a 149 performance of the duty . But it will appear that the discharge is in such cases an accidental and not a neces- sary consequence of the tender and refusal ; the debt or duty being discharged , because the cases were so pecu- liarly circumstanced that there was not , after the tender and refusal , any remedy to enforce the payment of the debt , or the performance of the duties. ( 9 Bacon's Abrg . 328. ) The effect of a tender when lawfully made is to discharge the debtor from subsequent interest and cost . (Ibid .) A plea of tender admits the contract, and so much of the declaration as the plea is applied to . It does not bar the debt , as a payment would , but rather establishes the liability of the defendant ; for , in general , he is liable to pay the sum which he tenders , whenever he is re- quired to do so. But it puts a stop to accruing dam- ages , or interest for delay in payment, and gives the defendant costs. (2 Parsons on Contracts , 629 ; see also Bouv. Law Dict . p . 582-"Tender ," fig. 6. ) There is another point claiming our attention with respect to the tender made . The collector as agent for the Government to receive duties , was not at liberty to receive anything but the monies described in the act for his instruction . Any specific authority to an agent must be strictly pursued . ( 1 Parsons on Contract , p . 42. ) An agent is not at liberty to exercise his discretion in the choice of a mode of performing the duty imposed upon him if some one mode , and that only , is fixed either by usage or by the orders of his principal , if he is a general agent ; or , if he is a particular agent , by his principal's orders alone ; for then he must adopt that very mode and no other. (Id . 58. ) The collector was bound to observe the act, and was not competent to set it aside as illegal and void, unless it had been so pronounced by a proper authority . We come now to the real essence of the case , the salient point of the bill of exceptions , which may be thus re- 150 solved : "The act authorizing one tenth of duties to be paid in gold or silver coin in good approved bills of exchange is not violative of the constitutional inhibition "Nor shall the Legislature make any law impairing the obligation of contracts ." There is , perhaps , no class of cases in which the sensibilities of a people can be more readily and com- pletely excited or aroused , than that in which it is pro- posed to establish principles relative to the currency and money of a nation , and to pronounce upon the restrictions that may have been placed on the exercise of sovereign powers . Constitutional questions generally cannot fail to be of great interest to all , and of much difficulty to those who have specially to deal with them, and to decide whether the law to be void for its repugnancy to the Constitution , is at all times a question of the greatest delicacy , and one that demands the greatest and most deliberate consideration . Chief Justice Marshall , in giving the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Fletcher against Peck ( as found in 6 Cranch , 128 ) , made this declaration : "A question with respect to the con- stitutionality of a law is one which ought seldom if ever to be decided in the affirmative in a doubtful case." "The court ," said he , "when impelled by duty to render such a judgment , would be unworthy of its station could it be unmindful of the solemn obligation which that station imposes . But it is not on slight implication and vague conjecture that the Legislature is to be pronounced to have transcended its powers , and its acts to be con- sidered as void . The opposition between the Constitu- tion and the law should be such that the judge feels a clear and strong conviction of their incompatibility with each other ." The force and justness of this observation . of the Chief Justice , we opine , is apparent to all . Now , while it may be the duty of a judge to harmonize the acts of the Legislature as far as he can do so consistently , 151 with the Constitution which he is sworn to support , yet it does not interfere with or annul his obligation "faith- fully and impartially to discharge the duties of said. office ," nor require him to uphold a law simply because it has been enacted . While he should be extremely careful in pronouncing a law void for its unconstitution- ality, a faithful discharge of his duty renders it impera- tive that he should do so without hesitation when there is apparent to him a repugnancy between the law and the Constitution . It is in this spirit , and thus impressed with our obliga- tion to dispassionately compare the law and the Consti- tution , so far as the case is concerned , that we have approached the subject , and sought for such legal light as would make clear the road leading to a just conclu- sion . We propose to analyse to a certain degree that clause of the Constitution embraced in the question as above stated . And first-What is a contract ? Various definitions have been given of the word , and perhaps the most gen- erally received one is , that "A contract is an agreement in which a party undertakes to do or not to do a par- ticular thing ." Broom , in his Commentary on the Common Law ( p . 252 ) says , that " in its widest and most general sense , the word ' contract ' signifies an agreement , obligation or compact , which may be either unilateral or inter partes ;" and he further states it to be " of the essence of every contract or agreement , that the parties to be bound should consent , expressly or impliedly , to whatever is stipulated therein ; for otherwise no obligation or recipro- cal right can be created between them ." (p . 255. ) In our statutes ( Legal Forms and Principles , page 4, sec . 11 ) it is defined to be " an agreement entered into by the assent of two or more minds by which one party under- takes to give some valuable thing , or to do or omit some act , in consideration that the other party shall give or 152 has given some valuable thing , or shall do or omit , or has done or omitted , some act .' Second-What are the obligations of a contract ? "The obligatory force of contracts is in every civilized country derived tacitly from the law by reason of the manifest necessity which exists , with a view to the well being of the community , that every man should fairly and honestly perform what he has undertaken to do ." (Broom's Com. Law , p . 259. ) A contract is an agreement in which a party under- takes to do or not to do a particular thing . The law binds him to perform his undertaking , and this is , of course , the obligation of his contract. The term "obliga- tion" is used as equivalent to "binding force ," or "vin- culum juris," and as consisting in the efficacy of the law which attaches to the contract, and if it cannot enforce its performance , at all events gives pecuniary compen- sation in lieu of performance . The word obligation is also used as correlative to " right ." Whatever I , by my contract, give another a right to require of me , I thereby lay myself under an obligation to give or to do . ( Broom's Com . Law, 261 ; 3 Parsons on Contracts , 555. ) The United States Supreme Court in the case of McCrackon against Hayword ( 2 How, U. S. 612 ) gave this U.S.612 ) interpretation of the phrase : "The obligation of a con- tract consists in its binding force on the party who makes it . This depends on the laws in existence when it is made ; these are necessarily referred to in all con- tracts , and forming a part of them as the measure of the obligation to perform them by the one party , and the right acquired by the other . There can be no other standard by which to ascertain the extent of either , than that which the terms of the contract indicate , according to their settled legal meaning ; when it becomes consummated the law defines the duty and the right , compels one party to perform the thing contracted for, and gives the other a right to enforce the performance 153 by the remedies then in force . If any subsequent law affect to diminish the duty, or to impair the right , it necessarily bears on the obligation of the contract, in favor of one party , to the injury of the other ; hence , any law which in its operation amounts to a denial or obstruc- tion of the rights occurring by a contract, though pro- fessing to act only on the remedy , is directly obnoxious to the prohibition of the Constitution ." And again , in the case of Curran against State of Arkansas ( 15 How, 319 ) : "The obligation of a contract , in the sense in which those words are used in the Constitution , is that duty of per- forming it, which is recognized and enforced by the laws. And if the law is so changed that the means of legally enforcing this duty are materially impaired , the obligation of the contract no longer remains the same." This brings us to the next query-What impairs the obligation of a contract ? Any laws which enlarges , abridges, or in any manner changes the intention of the parties resulting from the stipulation in the contract, necessarily impairs it. The manner or degree in which this change is effected can in no respect influence the conclusion ; for whether the law affects the validity, the construction , the duration , the discharge , or the evidence of the contract, it impairs its obligation , though it may not do so to the same extent in all the supposed cases . Any deviation from its terms by postponing or accele- rating the period of performance which it prescribes , imposing conditions not expressed in the contract, or dispensing with the performance of those which are a part of the contract , however minute or apparently immaterial in their effect upon it, impairs its obligation . (2 Story , Const . sec . 1385 ; Green vs. Biddle , 8 Wheat 84. ) "All laws which can by any possibility impair the obligation of a contract must apply either directly to the terms thereof , or directly to the remedy by which it is to be enforced," etc. (Ledg. on Const . Law , p . 605 , n . a.) 154 Our system of jurisprudence being borrowed to a very considerable extent from the English and American laws , we have deemed it as the most prudential course to go to these sources , and to search the reports in the construction of these terms contained in the constitu- tional inhibition ; and having laid down the principles as gathered and deducible from these , the next thing is to apply them to the case now under consideration . And in doing so we would observe that this question will not be considered in the form as presented to this court , as to whether the law in question does or does not impair the obligation of a contract, but will be confined to the special contract which it is alleged has been impaired . Our statutes declare that "The court to which the appeal may be taken shall examine the matter in dispute upon the record only ; it shall receive no additional evidence and it shall reverse no judgment for any default of form , or for any matter to which the attention of the court below shall not appear to have been called , either by some bill of exception or other part of the record ." (p. 62, sec . 10. ) This law does not allow us to travel outside of the record in making up our decision , and if there be any contract other than the one forming a part of the record of this case we do not feel bound to pronounce upon it. The contract as appearing by the pleadings in this cause and as admitted by libellant , is the engraved bills -bills of credit or paper currency running thus : "On Demand at the Treasury Department , the Treasurer of the Republic of Liberia will pay to Bearer in Gold or Silver coin- Dollars ." The admission of this as a contract relieves us of the necessity of any elucidation on this point , and we pro- ceed at once to consider its obligations . These are evi- dent and unmistakable on the very face of the instru- ment . These are that the Republic will at its Treasury Department pay to the bearer of each note , on demand , 155 the amount specified in gold or silver . It has been con- tended during the course of the argument that the receiv- ing these notes for duties is a part of the contract so made by the law making these a tender for such . Contracts between individuals and Government should be construed in the same manner as contracts between private parties . Let us suppose an individual to con- tract with another to pay him on demand a certain amount , and in a certain class of money ; that he should afterwards , for the relief or convenience of either one or the other, say, "I will take up the note or contract so given , by work or merchandise ." Would this affect the original condition or obligation of the contract to be paid in a certain class of money , and if it did not affect it, could it rightly be said to form a part of the contract? And if he should afterwards say, "I will no longer take up the note with work or merchandise ," upon what would the other seek his remedy , the subsequent permission. granted for cancelling the contract, or for the enforce- ment of the obligation as contained in the contract itself? While the Legislature cannot legally impair the obliga- tions of any contract , we think this prohibition must be distinguished from its right to adopt measures for the benefit of the nation , and from the necessity of the case , which may be subsequently varied or discontinued as the public good may require . It must be conceded that in every perfect and competent government there must exist a general power to enact and to repeal laws, sub- ject of course to such restrictions and prohibitions as the higher organic law or Constitution of the State may prescribe . The Government is competent to declare anything a legal tender, to say for what it shall be a legal tender, and from time to time restrict or enlarge the province of this tender , unless it be a contract in which it has bound itself to receive unqualifiedly . And the 156 defendant in this action , while he claims that the Gov- ernment has contracted to pay him in gold or silver coin , does not set forth any subsequent contract where the Government bound itself to receive this contract for duties . And we hold that the binding obligation of the Government is that expressed in the contract, and that this is unaffected by the subsequent tender laws . Does the act requiring one tenth of the duties to be paid in gold , silver or bills of exchange impair the obliga- tion of this contract? We cannot see that this act in any way enlarges , abridges or in any manner changes the intention of the parties resulting from the stipulations in the contract ; we do not see that the act affects in any way the terms of the contract, or the remedy by which it may be en- forced . The act authorizing the making of the contract does declare that it shall be the lawful paper currency of the Republic . But a currency may be lawful and yet not a tender for all dues , and the Legislature is compe- tent to declare for what it shall be a tender , except perhaps in certain cases . We have thus traversed all of the points properly before us, and at a very tedious length have endeavored to show our views and the legal authorities in support thereof ; and while we may all agree as to the authorities , there will doubtless be various and diverse opinions as to our application of them . It would indeed be remarkable if such was not the case , and we have not , in the framing of our views , attempted or even entertained the hope of avoiding such differences of opinion . We would not if we could con- trol the independent view of each individual member of a nation , and in the discharge of our judicial duties will not, if we know it, allow ours to be controlled by any other influence than what we regard as law , justice and right. For the reasons thus set forth, we feel bound and 157 therefore do hereby decree that the decree made by the judge of the Court of Admiralty , Montserrado County , on the 26th day of January, A. D. 1881 , is hereby affirmed . JAMES S. SMITH , Appellant , vs. FENTON ANN HILL , O. G. R. HILL and THOMAS L. HILL , Appellees . [January Term , A. D. 1882. ] Appeal from the Court of Quarter Sessions and Common Pleas , Maryland County . Ejectment . 1. A conveyance of land made by a party who had and held an abso- lute title therein , bars all claim of heirs or persons claiming under the original title of the conveyor. A deed , lawfully executed , is evidence against all parties to it and it is evidence of all title or rights trans- ferable by it. 2. In suits brought to recover real property unlawfully withheld it is a misjoinder for strangers to join in the action as plantiffs , where the grantee or person entitled to relief is living and under no legal dis- ability . This an appeal case that was originally tried in the Court of Quarter Sessions of Maryland County , Republic of Liberia , at its August term , A. D. 1880 , and is brought up from said court upon a bill of exceptions , for review . Therefore the court proceeds to consider the character of the positions assumed by the said plaintiffs (now ap- pellees ) in their complaint . Ist, "The appellees say that Delia Hill , deceased , was possessed of the piece of land described in their complaint ." 2nd , "That the title of the said Delia Hill hath lawfully come to them , the said appellees , and that the appellant James S. Smith unlawfully detains the land from the said appellees ." 3d , "That the said James S. Smith obtained a certain deed of transfer from the said Delia Hill upon the terms expressed in said appellees ' complaint ." 4th, "That the two hundred 158 and fifty dollars was not the true consideration agreed upon by the said Delia Hill and the said James S. Smith to be paid for the said lot number eighteen ." 5th , "That although the said Delia Hill during her life- time did transfer unto the said James S. Smith the piece of land , lot number eighteen , the said James S. Smith failed to do as he should have done , as was by mutual understanding the consideration agreed upon ." In our attempt to discriminate the right from the wrong involved in this case , we indulge the pleasant belief that it will require but a very little exercise of the mind to enable us to distribute to each party that exact justice that the reasonableness of the case allows . The court says , the second plea in the answer of the defendant (now appellant ) which alleges that the facts stated in the complaint of the plaintiffs (now appellees ) in this case are not true, is supported by the law and evidence in this case , so far as it relates to that part of the allegation in the complaint which says that Delia Hill , deceased , was possessed of the lot of land , number eighteen , in the upper ward of the city of Buchanan , in the County of Grand Bassa , Republic of Liberia , and that the title of the said Delia Hill hath lawfully come to them, the said appellees ; for by the admission of the appellees and the evidence in the case it is clearly shown that a consideration of two hundred and fifty dollars is declared upon the face of the said transfer deed , from the said Delia Hill to the said James S. Smith , to have been the amount paid for the said piece of land , lot number eighteen ; and this transfer was made in the life- time of the said Delia Hill , whereby all the rights that the said Delia Hill did have to the said lot of land , num- ber eighteen , was transferred to the aforenamed appel- lant James S. Smith , in fee simple , forever . This being the case , certainly she was , in her lifetime , divested of every species of interest , as owner of the lot number eighteen , that could pass to her heirs , from the fact that 159 the title of the said James S. Smith is complete and valid , in respect to said lot , as will be shown more clearly in the sequel . We assert that the said transfer deed we so often refer to gives to the said James S. Smith a complete and bona fide title to the said piece of land in question . And we entertain the opinion that we are supported in this declaration by the universal doctrine of the law on written contracts and other instruments . And notwithstanding the said appellees in their com- plaint allege that the amount of two hundred and fifty dollars , specified in the said deed , was not the true con- sideration agreed upon by the said parties , we say, if such was the case and the grantor , who had a right , at any stage of the arrangement that was being made for the transfer of the said land , to dispose of it in any way that would secure to the appellant the lawful right thereto , she did , by the terms of the said deed and the delivery thereof , establish in the said appellant a suffi- cient title to the said described premises . For the exe- cution of a deed for real property is one of the most solemn acts that mankind can perform in the way of a business transaction ; therefore , when it is properly and lawfully executed , it is evidence against all parties to it , and it is evidence of all title or rights transferable by it to all mankind . It is also the best evidence of its own terms and character , when fraud was not used as one of the ingredients to procure the same. Our next consideration is to show that there was a misjoinder of plaintiffs (now appellees ) . Whatever may have been the character of the deed from the said Delia Hill to the said James S. Smith , other than was by its terms expressed therein , or unless it had been fraudulently obtained so as to entitle the appellees to bring this suit, they were bound by the warranty of the deed to defend the said appellant and his heirs in the peaceful enjoy- ment of the said described premises . The said Delia 160 Hill's heirs , executors and administrators being her legal securities to the said appellant , for his quiet possession of the said lot of land , he is forever estopped from bring- ing any suit against the said appellant for the said land on the ground of heirship . Then, again, the said appellees , Fenton Ann Hill and O. G. R. Hill , not being parties to the deed executed by the appellant in favor of Thomas Woodfall Hill, his heirs , executors , administrators and assigns , and the said Thomas Woodfall Hill not being dead , the said Fen- ton Ann Hill and O. G. R. Hill had no right to join in this action brought in consequence of an ouster of the possession of the said Thomas Woodfall Hill , from the said piece of land , lot number eighteen , since their names do not appear to the deed as parties to the same . Here the misjoinder is very obvious , to our minds . In respect to the motion made by defendant (now appellant ) in the court below to dismiss the case , the motion being founded on an affidavit , it was not con- fined to the general rules of pleadings , for the very object of a motion is to obtain some rule or order of court , which the party who tenders it thinks becomes necessary , in the progress of the cause ; or to get relieved in a summary manner from some matter which would work injustice . The inconvenience of this misjoinder in this case is apparent from the conclusion of the court below , conse- quently the motion to dismiss the case ought to have been sustained upon the plea of misjoinder , since , in an action at law, a misjoinder vitiates the entire declara- tion . Therefore this court says that the court below erred in not dismissing the case upon the plea of mis- joinder , after hearing the same , and also in the giving of final judgment in this case . Therefore , it is the decision of this court that the mis- joinder of plaintiffs in the court below (now appellees in this cause ) vitiated the entire declaration in the case, 161 and that the title of the appellant James S. Smith to the said piece of land , lot number eighteen , as described in the aforementioned deed from the aforenamed Delia Hill , deceased , to the said James S. Smith , is a good and bona fide title for the said lot of land number eighteen , and that the appellees in this case are forever estopped from disturbing the said James S. Smith , his heirs , ex- ecutors, administrators and assigns , in the peaceful enjoy- ment of all the rights conferred upon him by the said deed . And that by the terms of the said deed , the appellees in this case are legally bound to defend the appellant , James S. Smith , his heirs , executors , admin- istrators and assigns , against any person or persons claiming any part of the said described premises ; and the said appellant shall continue in the lawful possession of said lot number eighteen , described in this decision . The judgment of the Court of Quarter Sessions of Maryland County , Republic of Liberia , given in this case as above referred to , at its August term , A. D. 1880 , is hereby reversed ; and the appellees are ruled to pay all costs incurred in this action . R. R. JOHNSON, Appellant , vs. THOS . H. CASSELL , Appellee. [January Term , A. D. 1883. ] Appeal from the Court of Quarter Sessions and Common Pleas , Montserrado County . A writ of injunction does not lie in cases where the title to real estate is an issue involved . Courts of law , and not equity , have jurisdiction over cases involving title to real property , according to the Statutes of Liberia . This case is an appeal from the decree of the judge of the Court of Common Pleas and Quarter Sessions , Montserrado County . An action of injunction is one in which plaintiff seeks to compel the defendant to permit matters to remain 162 in the present state, or requiring some specific act to be done . This action must be commenced by a writ of injunction , to obtain which, the plaintiff must show in his complaint , verified by his own oath , and by such other evidence as the court or judge may think proper to receive , that he has a good cause for applying for such a writ ; whereupon , if the court or judge in the exercise of sound discretion , should discover that the right of the plaintiff is sufficient to warrant its inter- position , the writ may be issued , but otherwise it ought not to be granted . This court regards it an indispensable duty to state just here , in emphatic terms , that in no case where the issue involves questions respecting the validity of title to real estate , which ought to be settled in a court at common law, should a writ of injunction be granted for the purpose of deciding upon the validity of such title . In this case , this Supreme Court will only consider the rights of the parties under the circumstances surround- ing the case , without interfering with the validity of the title right of either party . It is , however , evident from the oral testimony in this case and from the admissions of the contending parties , that the coffee trees , which defendant in the court below was sought to be enjoined to abstain from picking the coffee off, are on the same lot of land claimed by appellant and appellee . We refrain from any expression as to the validity of the title rights of the parties in this case , to said lot of land . But it is our duty to say, whether the appellant has a good and bona fide right and title for said lot of land ; or, on the other hand , whether Jordan Hardy's title under which the appellee (defendant below ) sets up his defence , is a good and bona fide one or not , it is not a subject material to the issue in this case . Because the transfer from James Butler to R. R. Johnson , for lot number ninety -one in the settlement of Brewerville, so described in plaintiff's complaint , gives the appellant an 163 apparent right to said lot ; also does the Jordan Hardy's deed from the Republic of Liberia , give whomsoever claims under said deed a like apparent right to the said lot of land . This fact the oral testimony in the case plainly shows . It is not injudicious for this court at this juncture to observe , that whatever may have been the right of the appellee , under Jordan Hardy's deed , to pick the coffee off the trees on said lot , that right obviously followed the foreclosure of Hardy's mortgage . It is therefore proof presumptive , that the appellee in picking the coffee acted on a right assumed , and not from any right appar- ent, derived from Jordan Hardy to the lot now in dispute. Therefore, the judgment of the court below is hereby reversed, and this court adjudges that the appellee be and is hereby forever enjoined to abstain from picking coffee off the coffee trees upon said lot of land now in dispute , under any pretext of rights derived from Jordan Hardy's deed as administrator of said estate . The ap- pellee is ruled to pay all costs incurred in this action . URIAS A. and CHARLES S. MCGILL , Appellants , vs. A. WOERMANN , Appellee . [January Term , A. D. 1883. ] Appeal from the Court of Quarter Sessions and Common Pleas , Montserrado County . Debt . 1. The surviving partner of a firm cannot give a note for the pay- ment of money that will be binding upon the representatives of his deceased co-partners. When a partner dies the partnership properly goes to the survivors for the purpose of settlement , and they have all the powers necessary for that purpose and no more . 2. Where in an action of debt upon a written instrument , the instru- ment or note offered in evidence differs in form from that set out in the pleadings , it is error to admit same as evidence . Endorsements upon notes , where not stated in the pleadings , are to be considered as new allegations and proved. This case is an appeal from the verdict of the jury and judgment of the Court of Common Pleas and Quarter 164 Sessions , Montserrado County , at its September term , A. D. 1880 . Having reviewed the record in this case , the court is brought to consider the issues upon which it rests , and also the evidence and effect of the same . The appellee ( plaintiff below ) alleges that the firm of McGill & Brother ( late existing ) is indebted to him , and that Urias A. and Charles S. McGill , the legal representatives of said firm , are now indebted to him , the said plaintiff , by virtue of the written instrument , a copy of which is filed with the said plaintiff's complaint , and that the defendants ( now appellants ) have neglected to pay said debt . Permit us here to comment briefly upon the phrase " by virtue ," when it is used in respect to written instru- ments , as " by virtue of a written instrument ." In this connection those words are intended to show that the terms of the promise therein made to be performed , in their nature exist with force and power . But we shall have more to say about written instruments in another place . The copy of the written instrument set out in the complaint of the plaintiff ( now appellee ) bears upon its face a promise to pay the sum of three thousand one hundred and seventy - three dollars and twenty - two cents , upon such conditions and stipulations as are therein expressed . The defendants below ( now appel- lants ) deny that the said firm , McGill & Bro ., is indebted to the said appellee ( plaintiff below ) , and they also allege that the said appellee has no legal right to recover against them in this action . The said appellee , to prove his case , introduced wit- nesses , C. T. O. King and J. W. Howard . Witness C. T. O. King states as follows : That he was acquainted with the late J. B. McGill , and that he was the surviving partner of the firm of McGill & Bro .; and he further states that after the death of his partners , he did carry on the business in the name of McGill & Bro . 165 Witness also states that he recognized the signature on the document handed him as being J. B. McGill's for McGill & Bro. , and the signature of the witness to the document as being Wm . Thompson's , and the body of the writing to be J. B. McGill's . He also states that the other partners of the firm were , Doctor McGill , R. S. McGill of Cape Palmas , and J. B. McGill, but was not cer- tain as to the admission of Rockey McGill into the firm . Witness Howard states that J. B. McGill was the sur- viving partner of the firm of McGill & Bro. He also states that all the parties referred to in connection with the firm except J. B. McGill were dead in January, 1880 . The written evidence of the plaintiff was then put in : Ist, the deed from James B. McGill and Martha his wife to McGill & Bro.; 2nd , the note of hand given by J. B. McGill in the name of said firm ; after which , the said defendants presented a note published in the "Observer ." Having noticed the evidence introduced by the parties. in the case , we shall now consider how they go to prove or disprove the alleged debt . The first issue , then , is whether the written instru- ment upon which the action of debt is brought is suffi- cient in law to bind the legal representatives of the firm of McGill & Bro . We are of opinion it is not ; because it is clearly proven by witness J. W. Howard , that in January , A. D. 1880 , all the partners of the firm of McGill & Bro . were dead except James B. McGill, who was the surviving partner at the time the note of hand was given the appellee . And it does appear from the question put by the plaintiff in the court below to wit- nesses C. T. O. King and J. W. Howard , as to whether J. B. McGill was or was not the surviving partner of the firm of McGill & Bro. , that the appellee was not ignorant of the fact that J. B. McGill could not at the time of the making of this note of hand legally bind the legal repre- sentatives of the deceased partners, whose death oper- ated as a dissolution of the partnership . 166 When a partner dies the partnership property goes to the survivors for the purpose of settlement , and they have all the power necessary for that purpose, and no more. No court of justice would , therefore , sanction the act of J. B. McGill as the surviving partner of the firm of McGill & Bro ., giving a note of hand in the name of the firm , after the dissolution of the same by the opera- tion of death , however great the emergency may have been that prompted him to do so . It would throw wide open a door for fraud and dishonesty . The deed from J. B. McGill and his wife Martha was irrelevant , because it had no tendency whatever to prove the alleged debt ; therefore the court below erred in admitting it. If the court admitted the deed in proof of what was alleged in the reply of the plaintiff , it was nevertheless an error , because the plaintiff is only allowed to supply such new facts as would set forth more clearly his action before the court . The alleged cause of this action is, that the firm of McGill & Bro., lately existing , is indebted to appellee , and that appellants , Urias A. McGill and Charles McGill , legal representatives of said firm , are now indebted to the appellee by virtue of a written instrument (which bears the date of January 29th , 1880 ) the sum of three thousand one hundred and seventy -three dollars and twenty-two cents , and have neglected to pay the said debt. The instrument offered in evidence having on it en- dorsements , it varied from that set out in the pleadings , which has none on it. Therefore the court , after inspec- tion , having discovered the same , ought not to have admitted it in evidence , and it was error in the court below to do so. After admission of the instrument , it was nevertheless the duty of the court to regard the indorsements made thereon as new allegations to be proved , since they were denied ; for it would be giving sanction to a dangerous doctrine to allow the plaintiff 167 to bind the defendants to the payment of an illegal note by making indorsements thereon . If indorsements are used in evidence for the plaintiff, they must be proved like other facts . A copy of the notices referred to , as published in the "Observer ," not appearing in the rec- ord , this court will give no expression on that point . The verdict of the jury in the court below is founded on evidence that should not have been admitted . The court therefore ought to have given a new trial , and it erred in not doing so . This court also says the judge below did not err in refusing to arrest judgment , because it appears on the record that the law regulating the issuing of writs of attachments had not been complied with . It was the duty of the defendants to have taken advantage of this defect in the pleadings of the plaintiff at the proper stage , and their not doing so amounted to a waiver of that right . But the final judgment given by the court below in this case rests on an illegal verdict . Therefore the judgment of this court is , that the judgment given in this case by the court below be and is hereby reversed ; and that the note of hand, proved to have been given by the said J. B. McGill in the name of the firm of McGill & Bro . after the dissolution of the said firm , without any warranted authority , be and the same is good for its payment against the legal representatives and heirs of the said J. B. McGill , to the amount claimed by the appellee in his complaint , which payment is to be made out of the property of the said J. B. McGill , or out of his interest in any property of the late firm of McGill & Bro . , or , out of any interests of his , in property real or personal ; but under no circumstance shall his legal rep- resentatives or heirs be bound to dispose of and make payment out of any property or interests but that which is solely and strictly the property or interest of the late J. B. McGill ; and that the appellee pay all costs in- curred in this action .
Selected judicial document
Republic v. Sherman
Supreme Court of Liberia